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Introduction 
This paper has been written as a contribution to the FP7 project, Network for Green 
Growth Indicators (NETGREEN). The aim of the project is to accelerate the transition 
to a green economy by creating an open-access, searchable, web-based database 
that enables those working in the field to quickly identify and compare indicators 
that can be used to measure progress towards their vision of a green economy. The 
project will bring together and structure the existing fragmented body of work on 
indicators, creating indicator sets that are accessible via the database. These sets of 
indicators can then be used to measure progress towards the green economy 
according to different visions of the pathways that need to be taken.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework to help identify which 
indicators should be included in the NETGREEN database, and to help inform the 
structure of the database. It is based on a literature review of 92 reports on the 
green economy,
 i
 interviews with 55 experts from the field,
ii
 and discussion of our 
early findings with 39
iii
 experts at a seminar held in London in March 2014. 
 
One difficulty of this task is that the definition of “green economy” and views on 
how it will be achieved are highly contested; as the European Environment Agency 
puts it “the term 'green economy' is not consistently defined, as it is still an 
emerging concept”,1 although UNEP’s2 definitioniv is perhaps the best known and 
most widely accepted. However, during our research we have found that, according 
to all definitions, a green economy is one that is environmentally sustainable in the 
broadest sense; that is, an economy that operates without infringing environmental 
limits. Because our aim is to be inclusive, we are using this as our definition
v
 and in 
Section 1 we report on the debate as to how to define environmental limits. 
 
Beyond this, however, there is disagreement on what a green economy is and on 
how to achieve it, reflecting both different objectives and different perspectives on 
what is possible.
                                           
i
 See Annex 3 for a full list of the literature consulted 
ii
 See Annex 4 for a full list of the experts interviewed 
iii
 See Annex 5 for a full list of seminar participants 
iv
 “[an economy] that results in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing 
environmental risks and ecological scarcities” 
v
 Note that in adopting this definition, we are not suggesting that improved social justice is not a necessary 
part of the transition to a green economy, or is not desirable in itself. We are simply adopting a definition that 
allows us to be inclusive of the wide range of work in this area. Nor are we ignoring the importance of 
resilience in the face of environmental shocks.  
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Figure 1: The key positions described in each section of this document
  
 In Section 2 we describe the different objectives we have come across, and in 
Sections 3, 4 and 5 the different views on how to achieve a green economy. We 
describe briefly the debate about international relations in Annex 1. The key 
positions that we describe in Sections 1 to 5 are presented in Figure 1. 
1 :: Environmental limits 
During our interviews with experts, we found that the work on planetary 
boundaries led by Johan Rockström et al. in 2009
3
 (see Box A) is generally 
accepted as a good starting point from which to conceptualise, communicate 
and measure what would constitute environmental sustainability. Having said 
this, a range of criticisms of using planetary boundaries as part of the process 
of measuring progress towards a green economy were made during the 
interviews we carried out, including–:- 
 Using the planetary boundaries as a measure of environmental 
sustainability would fail to capture information about the depletion of 
natural resource stocks (see Box A) 
 
 Setting limits at a global level is problematic because:  
• Policies tend to be set at national and sub-national levels, while 
the planetary boundaries provide global-level boundaries 
• Global limits tell us nothing about how the impacts of breaching 
those limits will be distributed throughout the planet 
• Global limits on environmental degradation cannot simply be 
apportioned based on a factor such as land area or population, as  
the variance in ecosystems across the globe would also have to 
be taken into account 
• There are important regional and local limits which are not 
detectable in discussion of global limits. 
 
 There remains a great deal of uncertainty around precisely where the 
limits lie and thus about how seriously to take the limits, and we know 
too little about how reaching one environmental limit affects other 
environmental limits. 
 
 Degradation may be damaging before the boundary is reached, and the 
concept could create the illusion that this is cost free. In other words, 
the idea of limits or boundaries should supplement, and not replace, 
externality pricing (Rockström et al. would no doubt agree). 
 
 It may be impossible to construct adequate early warning indicators – 
tipping points are just too unpredictable and there are time delays in 
signals for certain limits – the use of boundaries may therefore create 
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false reassurance. 
 
 According to Rockström’s approach, breaching the planetary boundaries 
risks causing changes to the Earth system which threaten human 
survival. This introduces a normative dimension to the use of planetary 
boundaries, in so far as decision-makers must make an assessment of 
the amount of risk that they’re prepared to accept (in terms of 
threatening human survival), against the social and economic 
implications of acting to avoid that risk. 
These criticisms mean that indicators based on planetary boundaries will have 
to be supplemented in various ways, even as ultimate measures of 
environmental sustainability outcomes.
vi
 However, the experts we interviewed 
tended to agree that the concept of environmental limits is a valuable tool to 
communicate the need to transition to a green economy, and that prolonged 
discussion on the exact values of limits should not be allowed to postpone 
action when the direction that should be taken is already clear. This has 
implications for the kind of indicators to be used: direction and speed of travel 
may be more important than precise distance to the limit.  
 
Box A: Environmental limits and natural resource depletion 
Rockström et al.’s work identified nine planetary boundaries which represent 
the limits of the safe space for human development. The boundaries are the 
lower end of the range of possible values for tipping points - points beyond 
which “irreversible and abrupt environmental change” may result.  There are 
boundaries for climate change, biodiversity loss, nitrogen removal from the 
atmosphere, phosphorus in the ocean, ocean acidification, land use, water 
consumption, ozone depletion, atmospheric aerosols and chemical pollution. 
Of these, according to the authors, the first two have already been crossed, the 
next four have not yet been crossed and the last two have not yet been 
measured.  
 
In addition to these planetary boundaries, environmental limits can also refer 
to more local boundaries, defined in the same way by reference to tipping 
points, but where the consequences may not be global environmental change, 
but levels of degradation to the local environment agreed to be unacceptable. 
In either case, the critical point is that such boundaries represent tipping 
points, because the consequences of breaching them are so potentially severe, 
irreversible, and uncertain that the associated costs are so extreme that the 
externality cannot be priced.  
 
                                           
vi
 We acknowledge that such interventions are taking place – to some extent – at present, for example, 
through the implementation of national and regional emissions limits. 
 While the need to remain within environmental limits is recognised throughout 
the literature (either explicitly or implicitly) as a basis for which transition to a 
green economy is necessary, noticeably less emphasis is placed on the need to 
limit depletion of non-renewable natural resources. This seems likely to result 
from the uncertainty with which scientists are able to predict how much non-
renewable natural capital remains available for extraction. This uncertainty, 
contrasted with current detailed understanding of safe limits for atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gas emissions, may explain the greater 
emphasis on environmental limits (most notably, on the limit set for 
greenhouse gas emissions
vii
). In addition, the potential for environmental 
degradation to rapidly escalate as a result of the feedback loop effects 
associated with overshoot of environmental limits seems likely to increase the 
sense of urgency surrounding environmental limits, which depletion of non-
renewable resources is not subject to (this is not to say that depletion of non-
renewable resources doesn’t represent significant challenges to humanity).  
 
With the exception of Herman Daly,
4
 who calls for depletion quotas to be 
auctioned by government, those authors who do acknowledge the need to limit 
depletion of non-renewable natural resources tend not to set explicit policies 
and targets for limiting natural resource depletion, which seems likely to be 
due to the previously stated uncertainty surrounding remaining stocks, and 
therefore the degree of action required. Instead, these authors tend to call for 
inclusion of changes in the stock of natural resources in national accounts.
5,6
 
2 :: Entry points: different objectives for 
a green economy 
Our research has identified three broad objectives held by individuals seeking 
a transition to a green economy:  
1. Environmental sustainability 
2. Employment and business opportunities 
3. A better quality of life for all 
These objectives are not mutually exclusive: it is possible, and in some cases 
likely, that an individual will hold more than one of these objectives.  
The most likely combinations of objectives, and those likely to hold them are 
as follows:-  
 Environmental sustainability:  
                                           
vii
 For some non-renewable natural resources, it is possible to track the resulting emissions associated 
with their use in order to gain some understanding of the rate at which the resources are being used up 
(for example, the use of fossil fuels can be understood to an extent through tracking the concentration 
of carbon in the Earth’s atmosphere); however, this only gives an indication of the rate of use, and not 
the stock of resources remaining. 
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o Environmentalists who do not also have a social agenda 
 
 Employment and business opportunities: 
o Businesses seeking to profit from markets which expand as a 
result of the transition to a green economy 
o Governments hoping to increase standards of living, which also 
recognise the opportunities created by the transition to a green 
economy 
 
 Employment and business opportunities, and environmental 
sustainability:  
o Businesses seeking to profit from markets which expand as a 
result of the transition to a green economy, which also believe 
that failure to achieve sustainability will have a damaging long-
term effect on profits 
o Governments who recognise the imperative of sustainability but 
are looking to minimise socio-economic change while increasing 
standards of living  
 
 A better quality of life for all and environmental sustainability:  
o Environmentalists who also have a social agenda 
o Social campaigners/progressive politicians who believe in the 
importance of environmental sustainability for achieving social 
objectives 
 
 All three objectives 
o Social campaigners/progressive politicians/governments who 
believe in the importance of the environment for social 
objectives, but who also believe in the importance of 
employment and business opportunities for those objectives 
These objectives, which are influenced by individuals’ motivations, 
experiences, and exposure to information and ideas, as well as other external 
factors, result in divergent views on how to achieve a green economy. In the 
following sections, we describe the key points of disagreement regarding: 
 
 The strategic approach needed to achieve a green economy (Section 3) 
 
 The types of interventions needed to operationalise the strategic 
approach (Section 4), and  
 
 The action necessary to gain political acceptance for the changes 
needed (Section 5).  
In the discussion below, we have framed the disagreements in terms of what 
participants believe will work to deliver a green economy. We believe this 
 stands up intellectually – you really can explain the differences in these terms – 
but we also believe  it may help de-polarise the discussion and help create 
some convergence between different view points. This is in contrast to the 
framing in terms of attitudes to growth adopted elsewhere (i.e. the choice is 
presented as a choice between a “green-growth” strategy and a “steady state” 
or “de-growth” strategy)viii which we think can lead to unconstructive 
polarisation and caricature.    
3 :: Strategic approach: technological 
versus socio-economic change 
The first key area of disagreement about how to achieve a green economy is 
over the relative importance of technological and socio-economic change
ix
 (the 
latter driving consumption and sometimes referred to misleadingly as 
“behaviour change”). At one end of this spectrum, technological innovation is 
predicted to be so successful that it allows a transition to a green economy, 
with consumers barely noticing, or at any rate tolerating, any increased cost of 
living or changes in relative prices. In other words ‘absolute decoupling’x 
based on new technologies allows increases in living standards to take place 
without increases in environmental damage
xi
.
7
 Some more cautious proponents 
of this view, whilst recognising technological innovation as critical in order to 
progress towards a green economy, also acknowledge that the probability of 
such innovation producing decoupling to the extent needed is uncertain. 
Adherents of this perspective recommend that we have a ‘Plan B’, in case 
technological innovation is not successful. 
8
 Other variations on this view 
emphasise the importance of new business models and “the circular economy.” 
We group these perspectives under “View 3.1: Technological innovation will 
play the key role”. The view at the other end of the spectrum is that much of 
the technological change will be either expensive, or may simply not come 
about. The implication is that living within environmental limits will involve 
much higher prices for some goods, with the use of natural resources limited 
through changes to consumption patterns. This will involve either a reduction 
in aggregate consumption (in the developed world), or at least a change in 
                                           
 
ix
 We use the term “socio-economic change” here, rather than the narrower “behaviour change” in 
order to capture the relation of economics to social values, as well as more direct behavioural change. 
x
 It is useful to detail the difference between relative and absolute decoupling here. With relative 
decoupling, processes become more efficient, but emissions continue to grow as production grows; with 
absolute decoupling, processes become efficient enough that efficiency gains also negate increases in 
emissions associated with growth in production, and the absolute levels of environmental degradation 
fall. 
xi
 What is described here is a slightly different form of decoupling than decoupling from GDP growth, 
which is a poor measure of living standards, and which could be sustained by, for example, increased 
expenditure on more expensive forms of energy. 
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what is consumed. We call this “View 3.2: Consumption patterns which limit 
natural resource-use will play a key role”.  
 
At first sight, the question appears to be simply about the scope for 
technological innovation, or more precisely two questions:- 
 
1. To what extent will technological innovation eliminate the threat to the 
environment associated with the production of certain goods?  
 
2. To the extent that it will, how expensive will this be, and thus how great 
will the impact on consumers (and voters) be? 
However, our research (described below) leads us to believe that, whilst there 
is disagreement about what technological innovation can be used to achieve
xii
 
(with some taking it as axiomatic that it cannot achieve what is needed), the 
intrinsic uncertainty of technological development means that often what really 
divides opinion is as much about the extent to which socio-economic change 
will be possible and/or inherently desirable as about technology. 
View 3.1: Technological innovation will play the key 
role 
According to this view, the economy will continue to do what it does now, 
producing broadly similar goods but at much higher levels of environmental 
efficiency. Our review of the literature and interviews with experts suggests 
that proponents of this view may well accept that technological development is 
uncertain (i.e. not all advocates of this view have absolute faith in technological 
progress, although it is possible that some do
xiii
). However, the holders of this 
view believe that technological improvements are more likely to deliver a 
reduction in environmental degradation than significant changes in 
consumption patterns (the only alternative), whether changes in consumption 
patterns are the result of individual or collective (i.e. political) decisions, and 
whether the changes involve new forms of consumption which is less resource 
intensive than existing forms, or simply less consumption. In other words, 
advocates of this view believe that there won’t be a significant shift to 
environmentally sustainable consumption in the future, any more than there 
has been in the past 20-40 years. Some proponents of this view also believe 
that consumption patterns reflect free choices and that therefore changes 
should not happen, but this is an extreme view and not essential to the 
                                           
xii
 Constraints on technology include associated risks, i.e. in some cases technological developments 
(such as nuclear power generation, fracking and genetically modified food) have been rejected because 
their use is deemed to be too risky. 
xiii
 We recognise that in some production sectors there are high levels of certainty regarding the 
feasibility of decoupling a specific form of production from environmental degradation, without 
implying restrictive increases in product prices; however, we are not aware of any proponents of the 
view that absolute decoupling is certain across all production sectors in the economy. 
 position. The broader view is that given the difficulty of achieving consumption 
changes, it is better to focus efforts on what might work than on what clearly 
won’t work. Indeed attempting to change consumption creates the risk that 
voters and thus politicians will be alienated from environmental projects, and 
that as a result, even technological innovation will not get the support that it 
needs to optimise. It is also true that many of the commentators who adhere to 
this view are more sanguine about our ability to remain within environmental 
limits than adherents of View 3.2; as a result they may be willing to accept 
worse environmental outcomes in order to achieve higher economic or social 
outcomes.  
 
A more cautious variant of this view reflects greater concern about the 
possibility of technological failure. It accepts that as things stand, we should 
concentrate on technological innovation and investment rather than the much 
more problematic socio-economic changes that are the only alternative. 
However, given the uncertainties, these more cautious proponents believe that 
we should at least prepare for socio-economic change of the kind suggested by 
proponents of View 3.2 (described below), so that if technology does not 
deliver, an alternative pathway will be open to us. In other words, it is possible, 
even likely, that the necessary technology will increase the cost of living or any 
rate the cost of certain highly valued goods – and in some cases fail to deal 
fully with the environmental problem. Proponents of this view may also draw 
attention to the likely impacts of raw material price increases (especially food 
and energy). It is therefore necessary, according to this point of view, to think 
seriously about what will make these extra costs and changes to consumption 
patterns politically acceptable, in the way that proponents of View 3.2 do.  
 
A further variation within View 3.1 is the position that there is no realistic 
alternative to the growth-oriented capitalism that we have now – or at any rate, 
no high-wellbeing alternative – and as such, de-prioritising growth (a stance 
typically associated with those advocating radical changes to consumption 
patterns) is both unrealistic and undesirable. Some commentators believe that 
very significant improvements to environmental efficiency can be made, even 
given existing knowledge, and that while there will be costs to the consumer, 
growth will pay at least some of these costs and make them acceptable. So we 
might be able to rely on existing technology (which the Centre for Alternative 
Technology regards as being capable of allowing countries to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions to net zero), even if at substantial cost. 
 
It should also be noted that proponents of View 3.1 generally accept that 
marginal changes to consumption patterns are possible and useful. Such 
changes might take the form of moral or socially-driven choices not to use 
environmentally damaging products, encouraged by increasing people’s 
awareness of the environment and of how what they do affects it through the 
use of labels, or by ‘nudging’ through the use of modest differential taxes on 
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goods and services, and regulation and rationing of harmful products. It is also 
acknowledged that changes to technology can produce changes to 
consumption patterns. For example the technology which has allowed creation 
of websites such as eBay has also strengthened communication links between 
individuals, and this has presented the opportunity to greatly increase 
consumption of second-hand goods. However, it is generally accepted that 
these kinds of changes will not be sufficient on their own.  
View 3.2: Socio-economic change which limits 
natural resource-use will play a key role 
Proponents of this view do not deny that technological breakthroughs could 
make a huge difference; however, they believe that sufficient technological 
innovation at sufficiently low cost is at best highly uncertain. They also believe 
that simply rolling out existing technology will be expensive (i.e. will have to 
be paid for through reduced consumption) and/or it will be insufficient (i.e. will 
have to be supplemented by reduced or changed aggregate consumption). 
They also tend to be relatively sanguine about the likelihood of changes in 
consumption patterns, whether to less resource-intensive consumption, or 
simply to lower levels of consumption. Hence they place more, or at least as 
much, emphasis on achieving them as on technology. 
 
The foundation for this optimism is the evidence from survey data that beyond 
a certain point, consumption is not a particularly important driver of wellbeing
9
 
10
 
11
. Other things then matter more, for example security, job satisfaction and 
social relationships
12
. If this is the case, it may be possible to change patterns 
of consumption, or restrict growth in consumption without too much damage 
to wellbeing. Indeed, it may even be possible to increase wellbeing.  
 
Of course, attempting to restrict increases in consumption under current 
conditions would provoke quite strong resistance, and is highly unlikely to be 
suggested by any politician; however, it follows from the evidence on the 
connection between consumption and wellbeing that at least some of this 
resistance does not stem from the impact on wellbeing as such, but from 
something else
xiv
. Proponents of this view then suggest that this something 
else is not integral to human nature but is instead a function of socio-economic 
structures and culture, and can therefore be overcome. In other words, it 
should be possible to engineer our social and economic institutions (employing 
organisations, membership organisations, religious institutions etc.) and 
design government interventions (regulation, taxation etc.) in ways which 
would correct the bias to consumption engendered by modern capitalism, for 
example, by making shorter working hours more attractive. 
 
                                           
xiv
 The proponents of reducing aggregate consumption or restricting its growth generally accept that 
consumption for the less well off (in least-developed and emerging economies) should increase.  
 Some proponents of this view also believe that, even if it was possible to 
achieve environmental sustainability using technology alone, it would still be 
desirable to change consumption patterns, at least amongst that part of the 
population with more than adequate incomes. The argument is that less 
consumerist lifestyles in the top half of the income distribution would remove 
some of the negative social effects produced by inequality and by conspicuous 
consumption, and might even lead to better lives for those currently 
“overconsuming” and overworking in order to achieve this. 
 
It should also be noted that many commentators in this group compared to the 
other groups are more worried about the environmental limits, meaning they 
would accept lower economic or social outcomes to achieve a better 
environmental outcome. 
 
Much technological innovation is designed to increase energy (or other 
material) efficiency, and as a result the debate about the potential of 
technology has sometimes been coloured and perhaps confused by this. It has 
been clearly established that the benefits of efficiency gains on their own can 
be neutralised or even reversed by the so-called “rebound effect”,xv whereby the 
financial savings generated are spent on other environmentally damaging 
activities. Thus if efficiency gains were the only fruit   of technological 
innovation, it would be game set and match to view 3.2, and on occasion 
proponents of this view seem to imply that this is the case. In reality of course, 
technological innovation is also designed to decarbonise the economy, much 
reducing the importance of the rebound effect in the debate.
xvi
  
 
Consumption levels are also, of course, a function of population levels, which 
government can influence, for example through the empowerment of women 
by increasing education opportunities, especially in low-income, high-fertility 
countries. There are disagreements about how strong a role government 
should play in this, and it is an issue which tends to go largely unaddressed, 
due to the feeling that is it not politically acceptable to talk about controlling 
population levels. 
                                           
xv
 The rebound effect reasons that, as methods of production become more efficient, goods can be 
produced at lower cost, therefore allowing higher levels of consumption (either more of the same good, 
or freeing up income for alternative forms of consumption). 
xvi
 Once this understanding of technological innovation is accepted, two arguments come into play. First, 
renewables are currently more expensive than fossil fuels: the challenge is to allow the same amount of 
benefit from energy for a total cost to the consumer that is not too much higher than the current total 
cost. Until this is achieved there is no rebound effect. Second, once this is achieved there would only be 
a rebound effect if the energy system had not been decarbonised (or the other threats to sustainability 
in the production process not addressed). 
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View 3.3 Technological and socio-economic change 
is unlikely, until we experience significant shocks 
or disasters 
There is a third view, which involves pessimism about the prospects of both 
technological and socio-economic change, reflected in the belief that the 
changes required to achieve a green economy will only take place after 
significant economic and/or social shocks, or even (in an extreme variant of 
this view) disasters. This does not mean that technological innovation and 
socio-economic change is pointless – clearly limiting the scale of shocks or 
likelihood of disasters, and developing technologies, infrastructure and 
attitudes that will be useful after the shocks, are valuable. However this view 
draws attention to the need to prepare for these shocks: to ensure that the 
economy is capable of adaptation, and that it exhibits a kind of positive 
resilience. Such considerations might include how easily a national economy 
will be able to adapt to important supply chain disruption due to major 
regional conflict, or how a country could insulate itself from such conflict. 
Clearly, national security and self-sufficiency in key raw materials start to 
become ever more critical objectives.  
4 :: Interventions  
Almost everyone agrees that whatever mix of technology and consumption 
change is needed to produce a green economy, government intervention will 
be needed at local, national and international levels (it is also acknowledged 
that, on occasion, changes can happen without government intervention, for 
example, where waste or energy efficiency improvements are profitable at 
existing prices, or where an organisation acts in order to attract green 
consumers, by “greening” its products or image). However, there are 
disagreements about the form that this government intervention should take. 
 
According to standard economic theory, environmental damage is an 
externality, and externalities can be dealt with through some combination of 
pricing and regulation. Thus theoretically, the shift to a green economy can be 
achieved using these conventional tools, as correctly set prices will drive the 
market to respond appropriately, stimulating investment in new technologies, 
and new, environmentally friendly products. Perhaps the most perfect 
expression of this idea is the view that climate change could be dealt with by 
setting a global cap on carbon emissions, with tradable pollution permits 
allocated in a global market. 
 
In reality, almost no-one believes that such a simple solution could work, 
largely because there would be some serious losers subjected to injustices 
(e.g. fuel poverty, inequality), or there would be insurmountable resistance 
from powerful groups. A good illustration of this is the difficulty of 
 establishing an effective European carbon price to drive change. Faced with 
this, the question becomes the extent to which externalities can be 
internalised through conventional mechanisms, and to the extent that they 
cannot, how change to investment in technology and consumption patterns 
can be achieved.  
 
There appear to be two main points of view with regard to this. One is that a 
skilfully designed, and inevitably complex, array of incentives and regulations 
designed to influence behaviour and co-ordinated at an international level will 
be able to drive change without creating impossible opposition. We call this the 
“View 4.1: Incentives and regulations can work”. Within this, there are nuances 
with regard to the extent to which “light” regulation, such as incentives and 
directives which set minimum standards about the “greenness” of certain 
products will be sufficient, or whether more intrusive regulation is needed. In 
addition, some of the proponents of this view draw attention to the need for 
‘strategic’ regulation designed to influence long-term investment in green 
sectors, and to create policy certainty.  
 
The alternative point of view is that while regulation and incentives can make a 
contribution, they cannot achieve the level of change needed for two reasons: 
first, they will provoke opposition and at best be watered down, certainly at the 
international level at which they need to operate; second they will become too 
complex and difficult to manage. Accordingly, changes to economic structures 
will be more effective. Some proponents of this kind of change also believe 
that such changes could produce other benefits, for example a radical power 
shift away from existing elites. Government therefore should show initiative, by 
leading the way in terms of investment, creating structural change, and 
pushing for a new international settlement. We call this “View 4.2 Structural 
change is preferable”.  
View 4.1: Incentives and regulation can work 
According to this view, existing and new regulations and incentives of the kind 
already in place will be sufficient to effect the transition to a green economy.  
The key assumption is that while there will be losers, government will still be 
able to introduce these without a strong backlash - or fear of a strong 
backlash, whether from business or consumers/voters. This would imply a 
gradual transition with no structural changes to the economy. 
 
Thus, proponents of this view judge firstly that a critical mass of business will 
welcome regulation and incentives that helps them to green their operations. 
This may be because their assessment is that the measures reduce the risks 
associated with resource scarcity or the risks associated with more stringent 
regulations being introduced in the future , or because they believe that 
regulation will create new markets and for some firms create a competitive 
advantage in those markets, or because corporate social responsibility plays an 
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important role. In general, this support will depend on any regulations or 
negative incentives (taxes etc.) being introduced at an international scale over 
a reasonably short period, i.e. preserving a level playing field and preventing 
‘carbon leakage’ and similar distortions. This means that supporters of this 
view must assume that international agreement on a package of measures can 
be agreed (having said which, there are some relatively low-cost improvements 
in efficiency that could be introduced unilaterally, and which could drive 
improvements in other countries who want to export to the regulated markets.) 
 
The assumption is also that consumers and voters will also support such 
policies for one of the following reasons: 
 
 They take a long-sighted view and therefore perceive the necessity of 
action in order for the benefit of future generations.  
 
 They can be convinced that an increased cost of living is not implied by 
such policies, or that the increased cost will have less of a negative 
impact on their wellbeing than damage done to the environment. 
 
 They can be persuaded because of the prospect of green jobs, whether 
these are the results of investment in green infrastructure or processes 
(i.e. in the transition to a green economy) or the results of new 
competitive advantage. 
We return to the assumptions about consumers and voters in the section on 
politics below.  
 
It is easier to make these assumptions if you don’t think tough regulation or 
high externality prices will be needed, either because the limits are not so 
close, or because they are not absolute (see section 1) and that therefore the 
normal political and economic bargaining processes for managing other trade-
offs will be adequate to set the optimum level of taxation and regulation.   
 
Some commentators, while agreeing that regulation and incentives are needed, 
draw attention to the lack of policy credibility: that is to the widespread belief 
amongst investors and in the business community that government policy will 
not develop sufficient teeth to deliver a green economy, and therefore that 
long term investment decisions should not be made on the assumption that it 
will. At the very least, businesses believe bets should be hedged. The resulting 
investments then create lock-in to unsustainable production, rather than the 
kind of technologies that will help to achieve government-set targets. This 
lock-in then drives business to lobby against regulations and incentives. What 
is needed, it is argued, are additional measures to stimulate long-term 
investment in the green economy, and thus create a different kind of lock-in. 
This will then incentivise business to lobby for the right regulations and 
incentives, making them far easier to achieve. 
  
These measures are all commitment devices – ways of building the credibility 
of statements about future policies. They can include legally binding contracts 
(as in the case of energy prices), treaties (including the treaties underpinning 
the European Union), investments by government (‘putting your money where 
your mouth is’), and cross-party agreement on core policies. 
 
View 4.2: Structural change is preferable 
Proponents of this view agree that incentives and taxation are part of the 
solution and that the existing system creates lock-in to an unsustainable 
economy and that this needs to be corrected. However they either believe that 
the kind of commitment devices proposed in View 4.1 will not be strong 
enough to achieve what is necessary, or that an alternative approach produces 
additional benefits, and is therefore more desirable. Thus proponents of View 
4.2 tend to favour a more radical set of socio-economic changes. 
 
The lack of faith in the kind of commitment devices proposed in View 4.1 may 
be due to a sense that such devices cannot signal effectively the very 
significant level of change needed (the more radical the change, the stronger 
the device needs to be). It may be because financial investors are particularly 
unresponsive to signals and incentives about the long-term. And it may be 
because such devices do not deal with political opposition from 
consumers/voters, but only from business. In addition, some proponents of 
this view believe that in the absence of structural change, regulation and 
incentives will become inefficient: too extensive and too complex to manage, 
as well as too unpopular.  
  
Whether this view is adopted based on lack of faith in View 4.1, or belief that 
an alternative approach can produce a better outcome, the types of changes 
advocated are broadly the same. These may be designed to create 
constituencies for change, including businesses that can thrive in a sustainable 
world, or otherwise create the conditions in which regulation is acceptable (as 
in the smoking ban case), create the conditions in which static aggregate 
consumption is acceptable – for example more equality, create new decision 
making structures (including financial decision making structures) that side 
step the existing market system and all of its well-recognised failures, or 
provide an alternative to (unacceptable) regulation, for example through direct 
investment in sustainable infrastructure. They are also designed to undermine 
the forces that block change. 
 
For the most part, these objectives as just described are not made explicit. The 
actual proposals include: ways of creating higher levels of wellbeing for any 
given level of output; higher levels of equality; encouraging fewer working 
hours; more of the economy serving local markets, perhaps encouraged by 
local currencies, and thus relatively less long distance trade; fewer very large 
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enterprises; a financial sector that is owned locally and serves local industries 
and small-medium enterprises; an active role for the state in planning and 
developing green industries and businesses that generate high wellbeing for 
both customers and staff; more mutual organisations and other changes to 
governance structures; new political narratives and headline measures of 
societal and economic progress; reducing the power of global financial 
markets – and so on.   
5 :: Political acceptance 
Several times in this paper, we have mentioned the role of optimism about the 
likelihood of change. Underlying much of this is a disagreement over what will 
be politically acceptable. This question is critical within both developed and 
developing countries, and at the international level. Box B sets out the four 
main types of policy proposed in the literature in order to build the necessary 
support for effective collective action.  
 
In addition to these policy proposals (which are not mutually exclusive), we 
came across two broad strategies for building support, which can be framed in 
terms of their approach to trade-offs: “View 5.1: Transitioning to a green 
economy does not imply trade-offs”, “View 5.2: Transitioning to the green 
economy implies trade-offs, which must be managed”. 
 
Box B: There are four main types of substantive policy advocated to 
build support or reduce opposition to change:  
 Job creation, whether within existing economic structures, or within 
economic structures that have been reformed to better reconcile green 
and commercial objectives; to the extent that those advocating this 
admit there is a political problem, the idea is that the political gains 
from job creation potentially outweigh the political losses from reduced 
consumption.  As noted in the section on interventions, there is 
disagreement on how active policy needs to be to deliver this.  
 Burden sharing, i.e. increased equality and security, reinforced social 
solidarity, a focus on meeting essential needs and building human 
capability. This may be put forward as an end in itself, a moral 
imperative. However it can also be proposed as a political precondition 
for transition, both in domestic politics (since it means that the costs of 
the investment needed and of sustainable consumption are born by an 
electoral minority), and in international negotiations (potentially 
reinforcing political support for transition within developing countries). 
In the absence of the latter, the green economy can appear to be a rich 
country’s objective. It can be achieved through a range of redistributive 
and ‘predistributive’ measures domestically, as well as through 
international transfers and investment. Most commentators will agree 
 that some burden sharing is needed – the disagreement is over the 
extent of redistribution required within and between countries and how 
to achieve it. For more on social justice measures proposed, see Box C. 
 Encouraging new conceptions of the good life which politicians can 
deliver within environmental limits. This is as discussed in section 3.2. 
Those with these new conceptions then care less about a loss of income 
as compared with business as usual. As already noted, only some 
commentators think this is either realistic or desirable.                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 Stimulation of locally focussed economic activity, which involves 
technological and institutional innovation that simultaneously delivers 
environmental performance and better lives. These innovations tend to 
encourage local economic activity – that is, production of goods and 
services that are consumed locally. The idea is that the reduced scale 
increases individuals’ sense of control, and reduces the opportunities 
for an elite to appropriate value, and that these (more than) compensate 
for any reduced economies of scale. They also reduce the environmental 
damage associated with the global trading system. This can be delivered 
through local economic planning.  To the extent that it is successful, it 
creates a group of people benefiting from the green economy and thus 
an electoral constituency. 
View 5.1: Transitioning to the green economy does 
not imply trade-offs 
Many commentators on the green economy stress that transitioning will 
produce benefits, particularly economic benefits. These may consist of new 
markets and green jobs (see Box B), greater resilience to shocks, or even an 
economy in which more satisfying lives can be achieved. Proponents of this 
view may state that these benefits will outweigh the costs of transitioning to a 
green economy, 
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 and as such, there is no trade-off, and no political 
difficulty associated with transitioning. According to this perspective, the 
transition is underway already, and where blocks to progress exist, these are 
not political: for example, the technology required for pathway envisaged does 
not yet exist
xvii
.  
 
A related view is that it is not helpful to emphasise trade-offs. UNEP, for 
example implies that the belief that there is a problem itself creates the 
political problem for sustainability
xviii
, and that there is no underlying problem. 
The importance of framing this as a ‘win-win’ situation (‘green growth’) has 
been emphasised by international organisations, where it is believed that a 
                                           
xvii
 Shortage of investment is in fact a political difficulty because it reflects either inadequate policy or 
lack of belief in consistent government policy as discussed above 
xviii
 This may well be true – GDP and other measures of economic progress may continue to rise, 
particularly in the developing world - but this does not mean that the consumption of certain powerful 
groups may not have to fall. 
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politically attractive pay-off has to be demonstrated in order to gain support 
for meaningful action.  
 
The extent to which either variant of this view is plausible will depend on how 
large-scale the changes needed are perceived to be – the larger they are, the 
larger costs, and therefore the larger the compensating benefits needed.  
View 5.2: Transitioning to the green economy 
implies trade-offs, which must be managed 
Other commentators make the case that as things are now, the pay offs from 
green growth will be too weak to compensate for the associated costs – at least 
if ‘green’ means as green as is needed.16 This is for a range of reasons, for 
example it may be that the pay-offs could be created in much more cost 
effective ways than transitioning to a green economy, or that they will only 
benefit certain groups, and will make things more difficult for other groups. 
Advocates of this view tend to think that acknowledging these difficulties is the 
first step to dealing with them. 
 
Approaches to this latter stage include: 
 Burden sharing so that an electoral coalition (or international coalition) 
for change can be constructed (see Box B with more detail on social 
justice measures in Box C). 
 
 Development of new narratives, for example framing the issue as one of 
security, and active engagement with stakeholders and civil society 
organisations. Targets, indicators and data (including new ways of 
presenting national accounts) are part of the armoury of making change 
happen: they are political tools, forming the centre piece of a narrative, 
in the way that GDP forms the centre piece of the growth narrative.  
 
 Increasing transparency and accountable decision-making as part of the 
process of challenging powerful interests. The assumption being made 
here is that the trade-offs are more difficult because of the power of 
these interests, and that transparency will reduce this power.  
 
 As described by the World Bank17: “local strategies are needed because 
what works depends on local political economy”; this requires an 
“analysis of acceptability and urgency” and prioritising accordingly – 
acceptability is greatest where local benefits (e.g. jobs, increased safety) 
offset the transition costs; urgency is where there are lock-in effects in 
the absence of action (e.g. land use planning). 
A more radical variant on this view is that structural change is needed to make 
the trade-offs less acute. This view is proposed for a range of reasons, but 
 partly because it is expected to facilitate a change in aspirations and thus the 
terms of the trade-off. So, for example it has been proposed that we will need 
an economy where shorter working weeks, accompanied by support for the 
lowest-earning members of society, become acceptable to citizens, and indeed, 
are viewed as a benefit rather than a cost associated with transitioning.  This 
requires much greater economic equality. More generally, the economy can be 
managed explicitly to achieve the various drivers of wellbeing: economic 
security, social contacts, improvements to the physical environment, improved 
health, and so on.  
 
Structural change could also involve making changes to the rules of the game 
in order to align social and private interest. The Dutch Sustainable Growth 
Coalition
18
 of large businesses calls for aligning business incentives with social 
and environmental progress – with businesses actively pursuing long-term 
value for a range of stakeholders.  
 
Box C: Measures advocated to increase social justice  
A very wide range of measures are advocated, which are grouped below. An 
important observation is the lack of discussion of the trade-offs associated 
with the measures described below, which is largely omitted from discussions 
of social justice in the literature. 
 Delivering good jobs. This involves both creating and supporting jobs and 
ensuring that as many jobs as possible are ‘good’, in terms of opportunities 
for training, adequate wages, safe working conditions, job security, 
reasonable career prospects and workers’ rights (all this an obligation that 
government needs to encourage business to bear, and so represents a 
trade-off in terms of winning support from business in terms of 
transitioning to a green economy). It also involves ensuring access to the 
labour market - provision of information, and education and training for all, 
including all ages. This call for higher levels of employment implies greater 
levels of production and consumption levels, unless the new jobs created 
are carefully formulated to address such. 
 Ensuring fair access to resources and services. In addition to education 
and training, this includes ensuring access to clean water and basic 
sanitation, clean energy, knowledge, health and care services, housing, and 
all other basic goods and services that are essential for life and health. A 
difficulty associated with this will be determining at what level such 
resources and services cease to become essential. 
 Ensuring decent local environments and communities. This includes local 
economic development, particularly to increase local resilience, support for 
culture and sports, safety, solidarity – and more broadly promoting cross-
cultural sensitivity and education and anti-discrimination measures. 
Business strategies should also include strengthening communities 
particularly in the least-developed and emerging economies, for example by 
developing products that help vulnerable people, or that are widely 
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affordable. They can also partner with communities to preserve natural 
resources.  
 Creating income and wealth equality. In addition to what is delivered 
through good jobs and fair access to resource and services, this can involve 
maximum and minimum wage or income limits, progressive taxes 
(including a financial transactions tax and anti-avoidance measures), 
income support and social protection measures (including to help limit 
damage to workers most likely to be affected by the shift to a green 
economy), universal child-care benefits, work sharing, addressing gender 
inequality, emergency poverty relief and many other mechanisms. Such 
measures would seem to be designed to comply more directly with the 
social components of definitions of a green economy, and the 
environmental aspects more indirectly. Management of property rights 
and rights over common resources. This includes reviewing intellectual 
property rights; better definition and enforcement of common resource use 
rights, for example in the high seas, mangroves, coral reefs, flood plains 
and forests; payments for ecosystems services; and strengthening of the 
land and natural resource ownership and access rights of the poor. Most 
developing countries face enormous economic pressures to overexploit 
their environmental resources, especially where tenure or use rights are 
insufficiently defined or enforced. There could be international interest in 
creating conditions that reduce these pressures.  
 Fair allocation of the costs of sustainability through international 
agreement to internalize environmental and social costs on their products; 
with costs shared by the government, business and individuals, and equal 
per capita resource and emission caps. 
 Sustainable food security: through sustainable systems of production and 
distribution, including more effective incentive systems which will allow 
global access to sufficient nutrition. 
 Democratic governance structures such as a ‘Green Economy Council’ to 
engage both business and civil society; steps to ensure that tribal and 
indigenous people have power over resource extraction; access to media; 
strengthened democracy. Businesses will need a broader understanding of 
value creation than they have now (ie not just profit) which implies stronger 
engagement with stakeholders, and perhaps reformed ownership and 
governance structures (e.g. co-operatives). 
 Targeted development aid designed to increase sustainability and 
capabilities. This may involve increased aid overall, including debt 
restructuring, but there should be a focus on: technology and knowledge 
transfer, strengthening technical and scientific cooperation, fighting 
corruption, incubators, dedicated funds to de-risk entrepreneurial 
investments and stimulate intellectual property sharing and innovation, 
special funding mechanisms (such as financial transfer and transaction 
taxes) for renewables, energy and resource efficiency, infrastructure and 
the protection of ‘carbon sinks’ and biodiversity.   
  An improved international trade regime that involves: fewer 
discriminatory provisions, non-tariff barriers and less protectionism - but 
conversely could involve a carbon levy on imports from developing 
countries; increased negotiating capacity of developing countries with 
transnational companies; improved international co-operation, governance 
and agreements on access to vital resources; and consistency between aid, 
trade, technology and other policies so as to support inclusive green 
economy transitions. Such measures may imply green trade rules being 
used, or perceived, as trade barriers against developing countries. 
 Encourage new models of development that are more sustainable instead 
of following the path of most rich countries. 
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Annex 1 :: The developed world and the 
rest of the world  
Our literature review and interviews were weighted towards developed world 
opinion and this section is something of an overview as a result. 
 
There are concerns from the least-developed and emerging economies that the 
aim of transitioning to a green economy is not relevant to developing-world 
needs. Specifically, policy instruments (such as sustainable public 
procurement, green subsidies and taxes, certification and standardisation tools 
and green industrial policy) are expected to marginalise vulnerable 
communities further, rather than reducing poverty. For example, small-scale 
farmers may not be able to afford ‘green’ certification systems and many poor 
people rely on subsidised fossil fuel prices in order to afford energy or 
transport. Least developed and emerging economies’ governments also fear 
that the green economy approach will lead to trade protectionism in 
international markets. As such, it is important that the transition takes account 
of the needs of the least developed and emerging economies. Hence the 
definition of the green economy coming out of Rio +20. 
 
There appear to be two main issues:- 
 To what extent should the least developed and emerging economies 
follow a development path similar to that of the developed world? 
 
 How much does the developed world need to ‘give’ to the least 
developed and emerging economies in order to achieve a global green 
economy? 
The view adopted on these is likely to determine the view adopted on a third 
issue:- 
 How much reform of international institutions (WTO, IMF, World Bank, 
UN etc) is necessary to achieve a global green economy? 
To what extent should the least developed and emerging economies 
follow a development path similar to that of the developed world? 
The question is whether attempting to become like existing developed 
countries is desirable and feasible for developing countries.  
Broadly there are two types of position:- 
1. The least developed and emerging economies should attempt to 
become like existing developed countries in key respects (although of 
course preserving their distinctive cultures). After all, why should their 
citizens not aspire to or be entitled to the standard of living achieved in 
the developed world? Having said this, of course they should be more 
 environmentally efficient than the developed world is now – but this can 
be achieved using existing and emerging technologies.  
 
2. Developing countries should create their own visions of progress, which 
are not simply imitations of developed countries. This is for three 
reasons: levels of wellbeing in the developed world are not all they 
might be, and citizens of developing countries can aspire to more than 
this; if the developed world is seen as the model, the development 
process will produce very high levels of disruption, damaging wellbeing, 
and very high levels of inequality (or at least fail to address existing very 
high levels of inequality); a world of 9bn people with life styles similar to 
those in the developed world now is simply unsustainable – and citizens 
of the least developed and emerging economies will be the first to suffer 
the effects of environmental catastrophe. Of course the last point does 
not mean that citizens of the least developed and emerging economies 
should have a lower standard of living than citizens of the developed 
world – change is needed everywhere.  
Within the second position, there are a whole range of views as to the direction 
to be followed.  
 
How much does the developed world need to ‘give’ to the least developed 
and emerging economies in order to achieve a global green economy? 
This is not an argument about morals but about what the developed world’s 
bottom line should be in the global negotiations – although of course ethical 
appeals can and sometimes should be used in those negotiations. (We do not 
think anyone really thinks there will be a major shift in developed world 
positions motivated simply by altruism and we are concerned in this paper 
about alternative views as to how we  really will achieve the green economy, 
not what would be ideal).  
 
Again we can polarise the debate, although there are in reality a range of 
positions. At one extreme, there is the view that the least developed and 
emerging economies will suffer most from environmental catastrophe and as a 
result needs developed world technology. The developed world, meanwhile, 
needs to incentivise its businesses to innovate and win the support of its 
citizens for change. Therefore it should take a hard line and give relatively 
little. Hence measures such as TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights) are justified.   
 
At the other extreme is the view that powerful interests in the least developed 
and emerging economies (whether democratic or elite) cannot or will not make 
the adjustments to their development paths needed for global sustainability 
unless transfers (of technology or other resources) from the developed world 
increase very substantially. What is more the cost to the developed world of 
these transfers is much less than the cost of the catastrophe that is otherwise 
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likely to follow. Therefore it should take a much more generous line and give 
much more. Measures such as TRIPS are not justified. 
 
As in all negotiations, the choice of view depends at least in part on one’s 
reading of what the other side’s position is and is likely to be in the future.  
 
How much reform of international institutions is necessary to achieve a 
global green economy? 
 
We have not come across any serious study of this question (as opposed to 
expressions of opinion) and it is possible to say ‘none’, ‘incremental only’, 
‘major’. We include this here only to flag the issue – and to suggest answers 
may be at least influenced by answers to the previous two questions.  
  
 Annex 2 :: Detailed reports from the 
NETGREEN partners 
This paper, although written up NEF, draws on research carried out by all of 
the NETGREEN partners. In addition to all partners reviewing literature, 
conducting interviews and participating in the NETGREEN seminar (see Annex  
3, 4 and 5 for further details), several partners contributed detailed reports, 
based on the work carried out during the literature review, which the final 
paper drew heavily upon. These detailed reports are included, in full, in this 
annex and the literature referenced is detailed in Annex 3. 
 
Report 1: The environmental limits within which a 
green economy must exist, written by LEI 
Wageningen UR 
 
1. Understanding environmental limits in a green economy 
Understanding environmental limits is a key phenomenon to clarify: 
a. The main challenges in society related to the environment (e.g. natural 
resources, energy, water, biodiversity). Such challenges could be the main 
motivation towards greening the economy.  
b. The main sectors in the economy at stake. Linkages are made between 
economic activities, use of natural resources and outputs; 
c. The need for green technologies, policy intervention and changing 
consumption and production patterns. The International Trade Union 
Confederation in their report on growing green and decent jobs (ITUC, 
2012) conclude that annual investments amounting to 2% of GDP generate 
millions of jobs in Europe, among others in energy, construction, transport 
and manufacturing.   
Examples of environmental targets and limits from the literature are presented, 
with a view to understand the main challenges addressed, the key sectors in 
the economy at stake and the links with production and consumption patterns. 
UNCSD (2012) in their report Rio+20 identify targets to commit to the 
Millennium Development Goals by 2015, and fully implement commitment 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the United Nations 
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).  
 
2. Understanding the environmental limits in the context of the main 
challenges in society 
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Several environmental concerns are linked to the debate on greening 
economies. WWF (2012) express concerns and propose targets in the following 
areas: 
 Climate: atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations less than 350 parts 
per million; warming kept below 1.5°C above pre-industrial average; 100% 
renewable energy by 2050. 
 Biodiversity: halt and then reverse biodiversity loss (Living Planet Index or 
equivalent measure). 
 Forests: Zero Net Deforestation and Forest Degradation (ZNDD) by 2020 
and maintained thereafter. 
 Freshwater: restore and maintain environmental flows in rivers, lakes and 
aquifers. 
 Marine: restore and maintain depleted fish stocks to sustainable levels; 
marine protected areas in at least 10% of national waters and the high seas; 
improve ocean health. 
 Nitrogen and phosphorus: dramatically reduce inputs to the biosphere and 
oceans. 
 Ecological footprint: stay within the Earth’s capacity to renew resources and 
absorb pollution and waste. 
 Waste: zero waste economy. 
The recognition of critical environmental and resource thresholds brings to the 
fore how the ‘safe operating space’ for humanity is to be shared, especially 
given that around a billion people currently don’t have access to the food, 
water and energy they need to live a decent life.  
Environmental limits relate to emission reduction targets and important EU 
and/or international targets related to the green economy include (DEFRA, 
2011): 
 Reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20% (against 1990 levels) 
 20% of energy from renewable sources (against 1990 levels) 
 20% reduction in primary energy use compared with projected levels 
(against 1990 levels) 
 Recycle 50% of household waste and at least 70% of construction and 
demolition waste (against 1995 levels) 
 Reduce amount of biodegradable municipal waste going to landfill by 65% 
(against 1995 levels) 
 Halve the loss of natural habitats and increase size of protected areas to 
cover 17% of world’s landmass and 10% of oceans 
 Halt loss of biodiversity and degradation of ecosystem services in EU 
 
The EU has met its 2020 climate and energy targets and is working towards 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990, as 
part of a global effort to limit the average temperature below 2
0 
C (European 
Commission, 2012).  
 
 3. Environmental limits are not made explicit in pathways for a green 
economy 
Environmental limits are not made explicit in several pathways for a green 
economy. However, environmental limits tend to be translated into 
environmental targets and ambitions. Ellen Macarthur Foundation (2013) 
investigate the rationale for a transition towards a circular economy, and clarify 
that economies could potentially benefit from a substantial saving in net 
material use, focus on the mitigation of price volatility and supply risks, target 
at sectoral shifts and possible employment benefits, reduced externalities and 
lasting benefits for a more resilient economy. Such targets enhance the 
understanding of pathways for an economy, without further explicit 
elaboration of the environmental limits. Similarly, ILO (2012) mention the 
actions that are deemed necessary for a green economy. The report clarifies 
that ambitions on the use of natural resources should focus on energy 
consumption, water and pollution control, extraction of natural resources, 
recycling rates, renewable energy production and resource use efficiency. 
GIZ (2012) and DEFRA (2010) indicate that absolute decoupling of economic 
growth from greenhouse gas emissions is an important feature of a green 
economy. Targets on resource and energy efficiency relate performance over 
time of economic indicators relative to usage of natural resources. Contrary to 
this, absolute decoupling occurs in a growing economy occurs when the 
emissions decline in absolute terms, while the economic indicator increases 
over time. 
 
Reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are often part of the pathway for a 
green economy. Jaeger et al. (2011) are motivated from a new growth path for 
Europe, especially where they indicate a green economy path enhances the 
European climate target with emission reductions to be increased from 20% to 
30%. Such a pathway would benefit the main economic sectors (agriculture, 
energy, industry, construction and services) and largest benefits are foreseen 
to be achieved in the construction industry. OECD (2011) offers a broad 
consideration of environmental limits, focussing on environmental and 
resource productivity. This report distinguishes between carbon, energy and 
resource productivity, reducing  waste and energy consumption and targeted 
towards optimizing productivity per unit of resources available. 
 
Hatfield-Dodds et al. (2008) identified major reductions of net greenhouse gas 
emissions to be key components of the green economy, with emission 
reductions targets to be 60-100% by 2050. In addition, this report also 
highlights the importance of improvements in resource efficiency with factor 4.  
Increasing energy efficiency is also often mentioned to be strategic areas for 
environmental policy targets. PIK & GRI LSE (2009) for example, identify the 
capability for G20 countries improving their energy efficiency through private 
investments to be in the order of 1% of GDP. Efficiency of energy consumption 
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is the ratio of economic output (e.g. production) to the physical inputs (e.g. 
energy). This report also concludes that at least 20% of such investments 
should come from public support, and measures should be applied for 
boosting energy efficiency in buildings and introducing fuel efficiency 
standards. Similarly, Netzwerk Ressourceneffizienz (2008) do not set 
quantifiable targets nor limits, but refer to public sector targets from the 
sustainability strategy in Germany, doubling resource productivity and energy 
productivity by 2020. Here resource productivity is the unit of GDP out of every 
kg of resources used.  
 
4. Environmental targets can be linked with economic growth paths 
Clear resource and environmental targets are considered vital by Jackson 
(2009), and this report highlights the need to integrate them into both 
economic and social functioning. Also, limits on energy intensity are part of 
Sekulova et al. (2013) where abolishment of objectives on economic growth 
require the reduction of energy intensity and reduction of consumption. 
Ecological modernization is a pathway towards a green economy with a focus 
on efficiency gains and innovation, and Lorek and Spangenberg (2013) argue 
in favour of a decline in resource use. In addition, the authors also highlight 
the need to balance living for most in accordance with the ecological and social 
necessity (increase human well-being of most) and a redistribution of wealth. 
Fortschriftsforum (2013) made an effort to strengthen the debate on the 
definition of societal progress and instruments are proposed to enhance an 
ecological sustainable economy, including improvements in resource and 
energy efficiency and higher prices for resource use.  
 
Economic growth targets and related pathways are often considered as part of 
a green economy. Jackson and Victor (2011) indicate a green economy is a low-
growth or slow-growth economy, which is service-based and therefore less 
materials-intensive and intrinsically more labour intensive. Environmental 
targets are therefore formulated to reduce carbon emissions. Quantifiable 
targets and environmental limits are considered important to enhance the 
understanding of the extent of action that is envisaged as being necessary for 
a green economy.  
 
The literature offers some attempts to define strict constraints on resource 
use. Environmental targets and limits focus on the notion of an optimal scale 
of resource use (see also Daly, 1991). This analysis builds on the consideration 
of the size of the economy needs to be sustainable relative to the ecosystems 
that contain it. This concept on sustainable scale and degrowth, as well as fair 
distribution of income and wealth and an efficient allocation of resources.  
Similarly, no explicit environmental targets are provided in Bartelmus (1992). 
His analysis, offering options what could realistically be sustained, builds on 
the carrying capacity of mainly local ecosystems. Dietz and O’Neill (2013) 
 focus on a green economy that aims towards maximizing long-term well-being 
instead of short-term profits. Several environmental targets are defined, 
including limits towards the use of materials and energy to sustainable levels, 
more durable and repairable products, stabilize population and create a 
culture of sustainability. In order to achieve this, the exploitation of renewable 
resources should not exceed the rate of regeneration, and the depletion of 
non-renewable resources should not exceed the rate at which renewable 
substitutes can be developed.  
 
5. Environmental limits and greening the business sector 
The business sector is not very explicit in identifying environmental limits. 
However, several investigations clarify long-term environmental ambitions and 
pathways. This is essential to understand what are the key sectors in the 
economy at stake and the need for new technologies. 
 
Raingold (2011)  for example, indicates a green growth strategy must address 
critical resource challenges beyond carbon as resource efficiency and related 
innovations. Increasingly, they become primary benchmarks of a successful 
economy and key considerations in the business cycle. According to the 
Confederation of British Industry (2012), without effective policy, the full 
potential of business energy efficiency will not be realised. One of the key 
components for the success of the economic agenda is that greater priority 
must be given to the triple challenge of decarbonisation, energy  security and 
energy affordability. 
 
6. Targets need to consider environmental risks and scarcity of 
natural resources 
Several investigations address the risks related to environmental impacts. UNEP 
and WRI (2011) recommend the integration of climate risks into government 
decision making, including mainstreaming climate risks and measures to 
mitigate such risks across sectoral policies.  
 
Environmental limits are aimed to better manage risks to the environment and 
society. Recent investigations on The Economics of Ecosystems and 
Biodiversity (TEEB) draw attention to the economic benefits of biodiversity and 
highlight the costs of biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation. TEEB 
(2010) highlight the limits to reduce environmental risk and prioritise (a) 
response to climate change, (b) ocean acidification, (c) release of hazardous 
chemicals and pollutants and (d) quantity and management of waste. The key 
components of suggested pathways towards the green economy for highly 
developed nations include reducing the per-capita ecological footprint and pro-
actively improve quality of life.  
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7. Moving environmental limits to maintaining natural capital 
According to the OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, natural capital are natural 
assets in their role of providing natural resource inputs and environmental services for 
economic production. WAVES (Wealth Accounting and the Valuation of Ecosystem 
Services) is an initiative of the World Bank involving several UN agencies, 
national governments, NGOs, and academic and other institutions. The 2012 
WAVES report to factor natural capital into economic decision making, 
advocates the use of accounting methods, especially the SEEA approach 
(System of Environmental-Economic Accounting), and to develop ecosystem 
and natural capital accounts. These accounts then allow the further 
specification of indicators for monitoring and benchmarking of natural capital 
status and health. The World Bank (2012) report on inclusive green growth 
emphasise that comprehensive wealth measures including natural capital are 
needed to maintain the provision of ecosystem goods and services. However, 
the report does emphasise that a clear measurement framework is implicit in 
the framework for action.  
 
The Roadmap to a resource efficient Europe (EC, 2011) set out the targets to 
be met by 2020, with targets on resource efficiency (e.g. economic growth and 
well-being is decoupled from resource inputs and come primarily from 
increases in the value of products and associated services) and natural capital. 
Among others, targets apply to the good status (in terms of quality, quantity 
and use) of waters in all EU river basins in 2015. Also, natural capital and 
ecosystem services will be properly valued and accounted for by public 
authorities and businesses. IHDP (2012) suggest the four kinds of capital 
(natural, human, produced and social) should be measures since it provides 
evidence on whether a country can increase well-being in a sustainable manner 
– not eroding one of its assets. In doing so, the key components of the capital 
approach, is based on the notion that decoupling is insufficient component of 
a pathway towards the green economy.  
 
8. Conclusions 
Economic activities (e.g. production, consumption and international trade) 
operate within the environmental limits and  targets formulated in a green 
economy. Limits and targets are formulated with focus on: 
a. Emission reduction – percentage reduction of emissions (mainly 
greenhouse gases) relative to a base year.  
b. Energy efficiency, the ratio of amount of energy consumed to economic 
output (e.g. production) generated. 
c. Ecological footprint, which is defined by OECD as the amount of resources 
(e.g. land and water) required for the support of a particular population. It 
is the inverse of the carrying capacity of a territory. 
d. Resource productivity, optimizing productivity per unit of resources 
available.  
 e. Natural capital, which are the renewable and non-renewable resources that 
enter the production process and satisfy consumption needs, as well as 
environmental assets that have amenity and productive use, and natural 
features. 
 
They enable to define limits and targets, focussing on the use of natural 
resources (e.g. energy efficiency and ecological footprint), emissions (e.g. 
reduction targets), productivity of natural resources and management of 
natural capital. Several of the limits focus on the use of resources, although 
some of them focus on efficiency and productivity of using resources in the 
economy. Such limits link resource use with the economic activities, and are 
flows in the economy. Contrary to this, natural capital is a stock indicator 
which is enables to understand the long-term availability of natural resources 
to support economic activities.   
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Report 2: The production needed for a green 
economy, written by NEF 
Below, we consider the convergence and divergence of views regarding three 
key aspects of production: the infrastructure needed for a shift to a green 
economy, the financing that will enable a transition, and employment and 
skills.  
1. Infrastructure 
1.1 Operational efficiency 
The majority of the literature states that in order to transition to a green 
economy, it will be necessary to improve existing infrastructure to make 
industrial processes, waste and recycling, building, and transport and mobility 
more resource efficient.  
 
1.1.1 Uncertainty over operational efficiency 
The World Bank (2012) agrees that technological development is critical to 
advancement towards a green economy, but is a lone voice in its caution that 
relying upon technology to solve the problems of environmental sustainability 
implies risk, as we cannot yet be certain of the future capabilities of 
technology. This highlights an implicit assumption made throughout the 
literature that technology will evolve sufficiently to allow the necessary gains in 
operational efficiency, or that today’s technology is capable of meeting our 
efficiency needs. The repeated emphasis by authors on the need for research 
and development into technology suggests that the former viewpoint is 
predominant; however, the Centre for Alternative Technology (2013) states 
that the technologies in existence now are capable of allowing countries to 
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to net zero. This argument may reflect 
the Centre’s expertise in the area of low-carbon technology, or it may simply 
be stated as a point around which to encourage discussion, in order to meet 
the Centre’s aim of providing a “positive and technically feasible future 
scenario for a zero carbon Britain that aims to stimulate debate and catalyse 
action”. 
 
Despite advocating action to increase operational efficiency in some detail, the 
European Commission (2011) also identifies a difficulty in relying upon 
efficiency gains in order to achieve environmental sustainability, whereby as 
the efficiency of production increases, consumption becomes less expensive 
and environmental gains from the efficiency of production are therefore offset 
by higher levels of consumption; a phenomenon termed the “rebound effect”. 
This highlights another implicit assumption within the literature, that 
increasing consumption will not undo any advances gained in terms of 
environmental sustainability through operational efficiency. Such a belief is 
 likely to be influenced by authors’ visions of the extent to which production 
can be decoupled from environmental degradation. 
 
1.1.2 The rationale for operational efficiency 
Differences in views regarding the rationale for improving operational 
performance are also evident. Some authors advocate increasing operational 
efficiency as a means by which to gain early, national advantage in a 
competitive global market (DEFRA, 2010, DEFRA, 2011; Confederation of 
British Industry, 2012; Aldersgate Group, 2011), whilst others argue that 
reducing developed world emissions is a necessary vehicle by which to enable 
higher emissions, and therefore development in the developing world, whilst 
not exceeding environmental limits (United Nations, 1987). These differences 
in approach suggest some incongruence between national and global 
perspectives, with the latter implying the belief that creating a green economy 
is matter to be addressed at the global level, for which international issues 
such as trade and climate change require eradication of global poverty. This 
position assumes that it will be possible to achieve high levels of cooperation 
between countries, and that the developed world will be prepared to act in the 
interests of the developing world. The former view seems to assume that either 
a green economy can be achieved at a national level, without the need to 
consider global implications, and suggests a view that the best approach to 
achieving a global green economy involves countries working independently, 
and in competition with one another. The views are undoubtedly influenced by 
the remits of the organisations expressing them, whether based at the national 
or international level. 
 
1.1.3 Quantifiable targets for operational efficiency 
Despite these differences in visions, there is general agreement that 
operational efficiency will be a key aspect of the transition to a green economy. 
However, a significant proportion of the authors who advocate increasing 
operational efficiency fail to suggest quantifiable targets in this area. This 
suggests that there remains uncertainty over the extent of action required and 
seems to reflect the inertia that currently pervades the transition towards a 
green economy. 
 
1.2 Renewable energy and a circular economy 
Increased operational efficiency tends to be advocated as part of a strategy 
which also includes investment in renewable energy technologies and 
emphasis on recycling and reuse of natural capital, a so-called “circular 
economy” (Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2013). However, the extent to which 
different authors envision renewable energy, recycling and re-use of natural 
resources varies. Some authors call for 100% of energy generated to come 
from renewable sources (Centre for Alternative Technology, 2013; International 
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Trade Union Confederation, 2012; Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 2013; 
Deutscher Nachhaltigkeisrat, 2013) as well as completely eradicating waste 
(International Trade Union Confederation, 2012; Ellen MacArthur Foundation, 
2013), whilst others explicitly call for renewable energy technologies as part of 
an energy mix, alongside fossil fuel technologies (Climate Works Foundation, 
2011; Jackson, 2009; DECC, 2011), or implicitly suggest such a mix by 
covering energy efficiency in great detail, with very limited discussion of 
renewable energy generation (European Commission, 2011). The discrepancy 
in the extent to which renewable energy and recycling of wastes is advocated 
suggests a difference in optimism over the technological or financial viability 
of achieving such, or a difference of approach in terms of taking short-term 
and a long-term views, as made clear by the United Nations’ (1987) explicit 
statement that “energy efficiency is not the ultimate solution; it can only buy 
time for the world to develop low energy paths based on renewable sources”. 
These differences seem to reflect different authors’ intentions: i.e. whether 
they are presenting a document that calls for realistic and immediate action 
with quantified targets and deadlines, such as the European Commission’s 
(2011) document, or whether the authors are presenting a far-reaching vision 
of a desired end-state. These differences seem likely to represent the different 
remits of the organisations, i.e. whether they are policy makers or theorists.   
1.3 Nuclear energy 
Of all the sources consulted for this review, the most thorough discussion of 
the use of nuclear energy comes from the United Nations’ 1987 report, which 
takes a risk-averse, but not condemning stance on its use. The United Nations 
(1987) calls for on-going research into increasing the safety of nuclear energy 
generation, arguing that its use is only justifiable if solid solutions to unsolved 
problems regarding its costs, risks and benefits can be found, and that the 
highest priority should be accorded to research and development on 
environmentally sound and ecologically viable alternatives, as well as means of 
increasing the safety of nuclear energy. The Centre for Alternative Technology 
(2013) and Deutscher Nachaltigkeisrat (2013) also make reference to the 
subject of nuclear energy, which they both explicitly exclude from their visions 
of a green economy due to fears over its safety. Of the literature consulted for 
this review, the only source to advocate the use of nuclear energy is the UK’s 
Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) (2011).  
 
The divergent views over the role of nuclear energy as part of a green economy 
seem likely to be influenced by the different authors’ obligations in terms of 
decreasing carbon emissions, or perhaps the authors’ interests in promoting 
renewable energy technologies. However, the lack of discussion of whether or 
not nuclear should be included  in the strategy for achieving a green economy 
is marked, which seems likely to be reflect the controversy which surrounds 
the subject of nuclear energy following the Fukushima disaster of 2011. 
 1.4 Infrastructure to reverse unavoidable environmental 
degradation 
Throughout the literature, there is a notable absence of discussion on the 
subject of infrastructure to reverse unavoidable environmental degradation. 
Some authors make general reference to the need to restore natural capital, 
but only a small minority make concrete suggestions of action to be taken in 
order to achieve this in terms of infrastructure, such as using carbon capture 
and storage technology (Food and Agriculture Organisation, 2010; PIK and GRI 
LSE, 2009; Forum for the Future, 2010). The lack of attention given to 
infrastructure to reverse unavoidable environmental degradation seems an 
implicit suggestion of the uncertainty held by authors regarding the extent of 
action required, and may also be indicative of the uncertainties and high costs 
associated with such technologies. In terms of motivations, it is unsurprising 
that one of the strongest advocates in favour of such infrastructure is the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (2010), which works to preserve industries that 
are particularly vulnerable to climate change. 
 
2. Financing 
The question of how to finance the shift to a green economy is addressed in 
varying degrees of depth throughout the literature. A portion of the literature 
presents a vision of what a green economy might look like, and how we might 
get there in terms of regulation, but fails to address the critical point of how 
the required investment will be raised. The reason for this omission is not 
explicitly stated, and in some cases, seems to represent an impassioned 
enthusiasm for change, unconstrained by the practicalities of implementation. 
Where similarly unqualified suggestions come from more serious authors, the 
approach seems to reflect the view that action is required, but that uncertainty 
remains over what form that action might take. This is a clear demonstration of 
the political inertia and lack of financing instruments identified by the World 
Bank (2012) as an obstacle to transitioning to a green economy. 
Many authors do, however, present strategies on how the transition to a green 
economy might be financed. The most widely accepted strategy is that of 
financing the transition via green growth. A second strategy, promoted by a 
smaller proportion of authors, calls for some aspects of green growth 
alongside more significant economic reform. The following section explores 
the differences of view held by advocates of each strategy in turn, before 
considering the disagreements and differences between views. 
2.1 Green growth and economic reform 
2.1.1 Green growth 
WWF UK (2012) outlines a quandary of financing the transition to a green 
economy, in that there is a need for substantial capital investment, which will 
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be difficult to achieve whilst avoiding growth; but, the kind of economic 
growth that we depend on now is environmentally unsustainable. A solution to 
this, presented in much of the literature, involves pursuing a “greened-
economy model” (United Nations et. al, 2003) or “green growth” (World Bank, 
2012; UNEP, 2011; Confederation of British Industry, 2012; PIK and GRI LSE, 
2009; DEFRA, 2010), which calls for producing growth via environmentally 
sound projects and policies, and wider and longer term development 
objectives around growth, social goals and environmental impacts.  
In terms of how environmentally sustainable such green growth should be, The 
UK Parliament Environmental Audit Committee (2012) calls for progress 
towards decoupling growth from environmental degradation, whilst Hatfield-
Dodds et. al (2008) call for “significant decoupling”. Meanwhile, other authors 
call for absolute decoupling (GIZ, 2012; DEFRA, 2010; United Nations, 1987; 
United Nations, 2012; UNEP, 2012; Green Economy Coalition, 2012; 
Confederation of British Industry, 2012; European Commission, 2011). Again, 
these differences seem to reflect different authors’ optimism and certainty 
regarding the possibility of achieving such, and the intentions of their reports, 
i.e. whether they are presenting a document that calls for realistic and 
immediate action with quantified targets and deadlines, or a far-reaching vision 
of a desired end-state.  
 
As with the discussion of operation efficiency, there is disparity in the rationale 
for seeking green growth, with some advocating it in terms of national 
competition and a vehicle by which to gain competitive advantage 
(Confederation of British Industry, 2012; DEFRA, 2011), whilst others view 
inclusive green growth as an essential vehicle by which to lift the developing 
world from poverty (World Bank, 2012; United Nations, 1987; United Nations, 
2012). These differences in views represent the incongruences and 
assumptions as noted in section of this report which discusses the rationale for 
operational efficiency. In terms of reducing poverty via green growth, the 
World Bank (2012) points out that the extent to which this is possible depends 
upon the degree of inequality. This reveals an implicit assumption by the 
advocates of green growth as a vehicle by which to eradicate poverty: that it 
will be possible to overcome the governance failures, market failures, and 
entrenched interests and behaviours under a green growth approach, which 
has not been achieved in the history of pursuing economic growth. 
 
Within the literature that advocates green growth, a key requirement over 
which there is some disagreement, centres on raising the necessary 
investment to facilitate that growth. Several authors argue in favour of public 
investment in the form of funding research and innovation, green financing, or 
incentives as a sensible act which will produce returns for tax payers (United 
Nations, 1987; Jackson, 2009; Green Party, 2010; IHDP, 2012) in the form of 
direct financial returns from energy savings, indirect returns to the economy 
from reduced emissions, greater energy security and improved quality of life 
 and social returns (Sustainable Development Commission, 2009; PIK and GRI 
LSE, 2009; UNEP, 2011). The dominant view is that such public investment is a 
useful mechanism by which to stimulate further investment from the private 
sector (European Commission, 2011; UNEP, 2011; PIK and GRI LSE, 2009; 
OECD, 2011; DECC, 2011; McKinsey and Company, 2013; GIZ, 2013) by 
reducing the risks associated with private investment and entrepreneurship 
(Green Growth Institute, 2012). These authors tend to call for such investment 
alongside regulation designed to stimulate private sector investment and 
ensure the sustainability of growth, such as emissions trading schemes and 
green taxes (OECD, 2011; UNEP, 2010; DEFRA, 2010; European Commission, 
2011), as well as using the classic economic mechanism of removing 
environmentally perverse subsidies to improve economic decision making 
(UNEP, 2011; OECD, 2011; GIZ, 2012; Jackson, 2009; United Nations, 1987; 
Griggs et al., 2013).  
 
Unsurprisingly, the authors with business interests tend to agree with the view 
that public investment should be used to trigger further investment from the 
private sector, warning that there is a risk that the potential of growth from 
shifting to a low-carbon economy might not be realised without improved 
conditions to drive low-carbon markets and stimulate investment 
(Confederation of British Industry, 2012; Aldersgate Group, 2011). However, it 
is also acknowledged by forward-looking business players that pursuing green 
growth is essential for businesses, in order to ensure that profitability is 
sustained by moving away from growth based on the use of finite resources, 
which will become increasingly expensive as their scarcity increases (Dutch 
Sustainable Growth Coalition, 2012; Aldersgate Group, 2011). 
 
Some authors are more sceptical of the role of public investment. For example, 
the UK’s Green Party (2010) argues that public investment should only take 
place if the private sector acts too slowly or on an insufficient scale, while 
others advocate greater emphasis on use of regulation to incentivise 
investment by the private sector (Climate Works Foundation, 2011), or policy 
designed to boost investor confidence, by offering longer-term predictability 
and stability around how governments will deal with major environmental 
issues (Deutscher Nachaltigkeisrat, 2013; Climate Works Foundation, 2011; 
OECD, 2011), and less emphasis on public investment. Without explicitly 
stating it, these authors are essentially calling for action to correct failures of 
the current economic system in order to encourage private investment. Other 
authors explicitly acknowledge that it is such failures which necessitate 
reform. The problems described by these authors include financiers’ 
unfamiliarity with the sector, and the often unfavourable nature of longer-term 
investments for financial markets, which are viewed as favouring short-term 
returns (World Bank, 2012; Green Economy Coalition, 2012).  
 
This spectrum of views implies a range of assumptions. The view that public 
sector investment is necessary in order to stimulate private sector investment 
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seems to be based on the assumption that the private sector will not act 
sufficiently or quickly enough. This view also seems to suggest that driving 
investment via regulation alone may be undesirable – perhaps over concerns 
that businesses will favour unregulated markets (which also implies an 
assumption that all markets will not be regulated in the same way), or the 
assumption that businesses will tend to take a short-sighted view in terms of 
the profitability of investments. The Dutch Sustainable Growth Coalition (2012) 
(a coalition of large enterprises, including Akzo Nobel, Heineken and Shell) 
states that this short-sighted depiction of private organisations isn’t always 
accurate, as business investors are likely to take a short term perspective 
geared towards profit maximisation, but stakeholders prefer longer-term value 
creation. 
 
Meanwhile, those who advocate limited public investment in infrastructure 
seem to assume that the benefits of private investment in infrastructure will be 
sufficiently high to compensate private investors, or else that not investing will 
be sufficiently punitive to drive investment (i.e. as resource scarcity drives up 
the cost of resource use). Finally, those authors calling for reform of the 
existing economic system must assume that it will be possible to gain support 
for, and acceptance of, their proposed changes. 
 
Despite these differences of views amongst green growth advocates, there is 
one big assumption being made by this group overall. Green growth advocates 
must assume that by focussing on economic growth in environmentally sound 
projects and policies, it will be possible to achieve sufficient decoupling of 
growth from environmental degradation to allow growth to continue 
accelerating in the developed world, and that a new green growth trajectory 
will be sufficient to enable developing countries to make their way out of 
poverty, without the need for significant economic reform. 
 
2.1.2 Economic reform 
Although there are several differences amongst the authors who advocate 
green growth, overall, the view that green growth is a necessary mechanism to 
facilitate the transition to a green economy is held widely. There are, however, 
some opponents of this view, who are critical of the generally accepted 
economic growth paradigm. These authors cite the existing economic system, 
centred on growth, as being responsible for the climate and financial crises 
(Miller and Hopkins, 2013; Jenkins and Simms, 2012; Daly, 1991; Daly, 1992; 
Sekulova et. al, 2013; Victor, 2008; Jackson, 2009; Jackson and Victor, 2011). 
Rather than calling for green growth, they argue that some sectors must grow, 
such as clean energy and small enterprises, but that overall, long-term growth 
is not possible, and is insufficient to avoid further crises and as such, any type 
of growth should not be the main focus of the economic system. Instead, 
these authors favour significant economic reform or, as Miller and Hopkins 
(2013) describe it, a “post-growth economy”, with a focus on recapturing the 
 financial sector for the public good and measuring economic success in terms 
of secure, well-paid jobs, well-being, poverty levels and proximity to 
environmental limits and inequality, in addition to some growth in 
environmentally sound and local-economy based sectors (Jenkins and Simms, 
2012; Daly, 1991; Daly, 1992; Sekulova et. al, 2013; Victor, 2008; Jackson, 
2009; Jackson and Victor, 2011).  
 
The authors who call for economic reform argue that there is a need for 
various instruments and interventions in order to correct failures of the 
existing economic system that go beyond what is called for by the green 
growth advocates. Their vision includes the use of classic economic 
instruments such as green taxes, emissions trading schemes and caps, and 
removal of subsidies (Daly, 1991; Daly, 1992; Ditz and O’Neill, 2013; Sekulva 
et. al, 2013; Jackson, 2009; Victor, 2008; Jackson and Victor, 2011; Jenkins 
and Simms, 2012), as well as significant reform of institutional structures, 
accounting frameworks and macro-economic relationships (Jackson and Victor, 
2011; Transnational Institute, 2011; nef and Green New Deal Group, 2008) 
with particular emphasis on reform of the banking sector. 
 
The authors call for much tighter regulation of banks (Dietz and O’Neill, 2013; 
Enquete Commission, 2013), geared towards creating a more stable financial 
system, which is diverse and decentralised (WWF UK, 2012; Jackson, 2009; 
Smart CSOs, 2011), which channels investment to foster ecological and social 
sustainability, including via implementation of a Tobin Tax (Forum for the 
Future, 2010; Forschrittsforum, 2013; Dietz and O’Neill, 2013), green 
investment banks to mobilise private investment for clean technologies and 
infrastructure (Green Party, 2010; WWF UK, 2012), ending fractional reserve 
banking, lower salaries in financial markets (Forum for the Future, 2010), 
capital controls, clamping down on tax avoidance and tighter regulation of 
derivatives, more national autonomy on monetary and fiscal policy (nef and 
Green New Deal Group, 2008), and separating retail from investment banking 
(Green Party, 2010).  
 
There is also a strong emphasis on the creating a financial system that is 
designed to help stimulate small-medium enterprises and community 
initiatives in order to grow the green economy from the ground up, including 
more mutual (Forum for the Future) and small, value-based banks (Green 
Economy Coalition, 2012; Green Party, 2010; nef and Green New Deal Group, 
2008), alongside the establishment of local currencies, to encourage the 
purchase and production of local goods and services and to increase 
community trust and reduce their dependence on imports (Dietz and O’Neill, 
2013). 
 
These authors also call for revitalising local economies (i.e. institutions and 
businesses controlled locally, serving locals markets) and strong local 
government to achieve resilience and stability without growth, from which a 
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new economy can be built (Forum for the Future, 2010; Miller and Hopkins, 
2013; IHDP, 2012). Such a view calls for investment by government in 
grassroots projects, local production, and  small micro and medium 
enterprises, which are viewed as being well suited to innovate with a view to 
increasing environmental sustainability (SEED/IISD, 2012; Smart CSOs, 2011; 
Green Party, 2010; Sekulova et. al, 2013). The rationale for this is that 
communities, cities and towns are more flexible at the local level, resilience is 
grounded in communities, and this offers enormous potential for flourishing 
local economies, in terms of jobs, finance streams and a skilled workforce 
(Miller and Hopkins, 2013). There is also the benefit that operating at the local 
level reduces global trade (Dietz and O’Neill, 2013). IHDP (2012) and Smart 
CSOs (2011) acknowledge some difficulties with this in that the resulting 
benefits will require government support to scale up.  
 
Overall, the advocates of economic reform as a vehicle by which to achieve a 
green economy must assume that it will be possible to gain the political will to 
achieve this radical reform. 
 
3. Employment and skills 
 
3.1 Employment 
The majority of authors expect that the transition to a green economy will 
create higher levels of employment than those achieved in the current “brown 
economy”, in-line with the green growth perspective on the transition to a 
green economy with the exception of a very small minority, who expect that 
increased investment in technology will result in fewer jobs (Green Alliance, 
2011; Worldwatch Institute, 2008; International Trade Union Confederation, 
2008). This difference in view seems likely to have come from consultation of 
different sources. The World Bank (2012) explicitly states that the evidence 
suggests that fears about massive job losses are misplaced. 
 
Of the authors who do envisage higher employment in a green economy, the 
majority expect this to be achieved as a result of the green growth, described 
earlier in this paper. An exception to this is the authors who envisage a green 
economy that is consistent with a steady state, or post-growth vision. These 
authors expect limited growth, and therefore limited job creation, but higher 
employment as a result of greater sharing of jobs (Dietz and O’Neill, 2013; 
Victor, 2008; Jackson, 2009) with the benefit that this will produce a more 
equitable society, and as a result, strengthen social capital (Jackson, 2009), 
and fight poverty and social exclusion (Victor, 2008). The authors propose that 
this will be made possible via implementation of job sharing schemes, job 
subsidy measures, and support for self-employed individuals (Victor, 2008). 
This is based on a strong assumption that the proposal of reducing working, 
and a concurrent reduction in income, will be acceptable to those currently in 
 full-time employment, as well as to employers. This contrasts somewhat with 
the World Bank’s (2012) view that the promise of jobs under the green growth 
scenario will be an important tool by which to foster acceptability of the 
transition to a green economy amongst citizens. This argument also implies an 
assumption that those who are currently unemployed are both willing and able 
to work, or will be furnished with the skills required to do so. 
 
The authors who envisage jobs being created under a green growth scenario 
cite several benefits of such, including that higher rates of employment will 
create greater equality (Worldwatch Institute, 2008); elimination of persistent 
poverty and greater social equity (UNEP, 2011); promote equitable ownership 
and workers’ rights (Green Economy Coalition, 2012); economic recovery and 
social returns (Sustainable Development Commission, 2009); and as a result, 
facilitate decent lives for citizens (International Trade Union Confederation, 
2012; Green Party, 2010).  
 
Many of the authors do not explicitly define how this job creation will be 
achieved, which suggests an assumption that job creation is likely to follow 
naturally from investment in green infrastructure, an assumption which would 
imply that specific investment in job creation will not be necessary. Other 
authors argue that there will have to be a concerted effort and investment in 
this area in order to protect the workers who are most likely to lose jobs as a 
result of the shift towards a green economy (International Trade Union 
Confederation, 2012; International Labour Organization, 2012; WWF UK, 2012; 
Food and Agriculture Organisation, 2010; Green Economy Coalition, 2012; 
Dietz and O’Neill, 2013; World Resources Institute, 2011; Aldersgate Group, 
2011; World Bank, 2012; Worldwatch Institute, 2008) in terms of training, 
income support, job search assistance, education and social protection 
measures. The International Trade Union Confederation (2008) argues that 2% 
of global GDP per year will have to be invested in order to ensure high levels of 
employment in a green economy.  
 
Many of the authors argue that quantity of jobs alone is not singularly 
important, but that the quality of jobs created must also be decent, i.e. 
considerations such as wages, working conditions and workers’ rights must be 
considered (Worldwatch Institute, 2008; Sustainable Development Commission, 
2009). SEED Symposim (2011) cautions that this may be problematic, as the 
technological progress expected with the transition to a green economy is 
likely to reduce the demand for highly educated workers, creating fewer decent 
jobs (SEED Symposium, 2011). 
3.2 Skills 
Human capital is recognised by several authors as a vital enabling feature of 
facilitating the transition to a green economy (World Bank, 2012; Aldersgate 
Group, 2011; WWF UK, 2012; International Labour Organization, 2012; CSIRO, 
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2008; Jackson, 2009; UK Parliament Environmental Audit Committee, 2012; 
SEED Initiative; Sustainable Development Commission, 2009).  
 
Where job creation is envisioned as part of a green economy, authors note that 
there will be a need for re-training and increased green literacy (Worldwatch 
Institute, 2008; Aldersgate Group, 2011; International Labour Organisation, 
2012) in order to limit “skills bottlenecks” (OECD, 2011). Several authors argue 
that this will require concerted action by government, businesses, labour, and 
educational and training institutions to develop and implement new 
approaches to green education and training (Worldwatch Institute, 2008; 
Aldersgate Group, 2011; DEFRA, 2011; UK Parliament Environmental Audit 
Committee, 2012; GIZ, 2012).  
 
These authors don’t all propose how this literacy and skill creation will be 
achieved, but CSIRO (2008) cautions that current knowledge of what is needed 
in terms of skills is poor, and that incentives and concerted action by 
government, businesses, labour and educational and training institutions will 
be required to develop and implement new approaches to green education, 
training and jobs. Meanwhile, SEED Symposium (2011) argues that 
governments have an important role in creating programs for training and 
development, but also acknowledges that there is a lack of access to funds for 
training, and overcoming this will be challenging. 
  
 Report 3: The consumption patterns and lifestyles 
needed for a green economy, written by The Centre 
for Environmental and Sustainability Research 
(CENSE) 
 
Introduction 
 
A common theme in the green economy literature reviewed is the need to 
change society’s unsustainable consumption patterns. This can be achieved by 
several ways:  the reduction in total consumption, the reduction in the 
consumption of some particular goods or a shift to a more sustainable 
consumption. These approaches have different degrees of change associated 
with them, ranging from light changes in our consumption habits to major 
social and economic changes. In spite of the divergences between authors, we 
can say that it is desirable and necessary to fight current consumerism.  
 
In the next sections the main drivers for change are presented and discussed. 
In section 1 we discuss what can be done to change consumer behaviour, 
mainly by focusing on education, directly or by setting a positive example. In 
section 2 we explore the possibility of promoting a more frugal, 
nonmaterialistic lifestyle, focused on well-being and interpersonal relations 
rather than on material consumption and accumulation. Section 3 unravels the 
more light view of sustainable consumption in a green economy, which is the 
change in the type of consumption. In section 4 we present the major desirable 
changes for reducing water and energy use. Section 5 reveals indirect ways to 
act on consumption, such as reducing wages or controlling population. Section 
6 concludes this theme, by presenting some major disagreements found on 
the literature and some general research pathways for advancing knowledge on 
the theme. 
 
Promote the behaviour change by educating people 
 
Educating consumers can change consumption patterns, by promoting an 
increase in their environmental awareness and by raising the information about 
the products characteristics (Creech, 2011; DEFRA, 2011; ILO, 2012; PEP, 
2012). In terms of education, more young people should be trained, and those 
already in the work force should be retrained, to be far more cognizant of the 
environmental consequences of what they do (Victor, 2008; WI, 2008). As for 
the transparency on the product labels, some authors go further and claim that 
instead of using labels to bring attention to the most sustainable products, we 
should label the most harmful ones (Lorek and Spangenberg, 2013). 
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Advertising is a powerful tool to influence consumers’ behaviour. A better 
regulation of advertising would be beneficial to turn it into a more informative 
and less deceptive tool (Jackson, 2009; GEC, 2012; Sekulova et al., 2012; Dietz 
and O’Neill, 2013; Lorek and Spangenberg, 2013). Apart from regulation, a 
good strategy might be using the marketing techniques to “sell” sound cultural 
values instead of consumer goods (Dietz and O’Neill, 2013). 
 
We should also promote the benefits of a nonmaterialistic good life, 
encouraging lower consumption and a greater satisfaction of fundamental 
needs (GP, 2010; Dietz and O’Neill, 2013). Initiatives such as Transition Towns 
demonstrate how a nonmaterialistic, sustainable lifestyle can be dynamic and 
refreshing. Additionally, other nonconsumerist institutions, such as 
cooperatives, land trusts and community workshops, should be created and 
empowered to de-emphasize consumerism (Dietz and O’Neill, 2013). 
 
More unconventional pathways should be taken in terms of education for 
sustainability, which can also change consumption patterns. For instance, 
promoting the participation in creative and collaborative processes that 
produce art, or recruiting influential individuals to be well informed as they 
could potentiate the change (Dietz and O’Neill, 2013). 
 
Promote a more frugal and conscientious lifestyle 
 
The environment in which we live influences our consumption patterns, and 
that environment has to be changed in order to impact a greater number of 
people. A green economy society should have a different structure for the 
economy, which should aim to be “more about the good life and less about 
how much stuff you have” (EAC, 2012). However, the individual acts are also 
crucial to the change and to set as an example for others. Therefore, the 
‘voluntary simplicity’ and more locally based economies and communities 
should be encouraged (Victor, 2008; Jackson, 2009; GEC, 2012).  
 
By promoting the “downshifted” lifestyle, one can focus less on consumer 
products and more on time, relationships and community (Sekulova et al., 
2012; Dietz and O’Neill, 2013). This will also be beneficial to avoid buying 
status goods and for rejecting other unnecessary consumer items, as well as to 
set positive examples for demoting consumerism (participation in local 
initiatives, develop alternatives to mass consumption by buying less, producing 
locally, rejecting mass consumer outlets) (Jackson, 2009; Sekulova et al., 2012; 
Dietz and O’Neill, 2013). For Victor (2008), status goods should be demoted 
recurring to taxation schemes. Sharing and leasing products is another way to 
reduce the volume of products we own (EC, 2011; Sekulova et al., 2012). Co-
 housing can be a useful approach to reduce the amount of household 
appliances that we have (Sekulova et al., 2012), as well as reducing energy and 
water use. A culture of repair and reuse should also be implemented to 
encourage a more circular economy and thus avoid over-consumption (OPN, 
2011). 
 
Greening consumption 
 
A change in the production methods is crucial to create more sustainable 
products. However, governments can also potentiate the shift to a more 
sustainable consumption by encouraging the consumers to choose wisely the 
products they buy. This can be done by introducing differential taxes on goods 
and services that will favour the more durable, more useful and less harmful 
products for the environment and health in the market (Victor, 2008). 
Additionally, the creation of environmental standards can be an effective tool 
for this purpose (UNEP, 2011). But a more radical approach is to phase out 
consumer products and services with the highest environmental impact (OPN, 
2011; GEC, 2012), so they will not be available in the market. A more positive 
approach is to reward greener products in the market, through directives like 
EcoDesign (EC, 2011). A State has also the power to improve the type of 
consumption of its citizens by applying legal and structural reforms to ensure 
that land is made available for small-scale agriculture and public housing 
programs (SWR, 2011). Individuals can also be actors in this change by, for 
instance, refusing to buy short-lived products in order to influence companies 
to stop planned obsolescence (EC, 2011; Dietz and O’Neill, 2013; EMF, 2013). 
 
Greening the public spending is another strategy pointed out by many authors 
(FAO, 2010; Raingold, 2011; UNEP, 2011; GIZ, 2012; EAC, 2012; McKinsey, 
2013). Apart from the benefits for the environment, sustainable public 
procurement can also help to create and strengthen markets in sustainable 
goods and services (UNEP, 2010; 2011). Examples of public spending within a 
green economy are to replace government fleet vehicles with ultra low-carbon 
vehicles and to invest in renewables and energy efficiency in the public sector 
(UK SDC, 2009). 
 
Ensure a reduction on resource consumption 
 
Reducing consumption is not only about cutting down on material 
accumulation but also reducing water and energy use. For this, it is important 
to build strategies that potentiate efficient water usage, as well as the 
reduction, reuse and recycling of wastewater (EC, 2011; GEC, 2012; GIZ, 2012). 
It is also necessary to invest in energy efficiency to reduce energy consumption 
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(DECC, 2011; EC, 2011; GEC, 2012; GIZ, 2012) and on renewable sources of 
energy to reduce the use of fossil fuels. For the WCED (1987), energy efficiency 
is a way to buy time for a low energy development path based on renewable 
sources. A programme of coordinated research should potentiate this path, as 
well as the development and demonstration projects commanding funding to 
speed up the shift in the energy system (WCED, 1987). The WCED (1987) 
recommends that Governments intervene in energy pricing to encourage the 
adoption of energy-saving measures. Other government measures can be the 
implementation of personal resource use allowances or caps (OPN, 2011; 
Jenkins and Simms, 2012) 
 
Indirect ways to influence consumers’ behaviour 
 
The previous sections explored direct ways to influence consumption 
behaviours to be more sustainable or to reduce consumption levels. However, 
there are also some indirect ways of influence changes. 
 
a) Through population control: A growing population is a pressure factor on 
Earth’s natural resources. Some authors recognise this problem, but do not 
tackle the need to control it (UN et al., 2003; TEEB, 2012). In contrast, some 
authors suggest that we should take some measures to control the 
increasing population. A direct measure would be to create transferable 
birth licenses for stabilizing the population (Daly, 1991), or to encourage 
nations to retain their most capable workers in order to stabilize 
immigration (Victor, 2008; Dietz and O’Neill, 2013). A more indirect 
measure would be to promote the empowerment of women through 
increasing education opportunities, especially important in low-income, 
high-fertility countries (Dietz and O’Neill, 2013).  
 
b) Through labour measures: Material accumulation is a necessity of our 
current economic system, but to pursue a green economy, some believe 
that this paradigm must change. By promoting an increase non-formal, 
unpaid, low-productive working time (Sekulova et al., 2012; Jackson, 2009), 
we will be fostering not only the valuation of work without money involved, 
but also promoting a more frugal lifestyle. In this context, other measures 
such as shortening the workweek and the legal facilitation of work sharing 
can be beneficial, as they might lower wages but also add free time to our 
lives (Jackson, 2009; Porritt, 2009; Jackson and Victor, 2011; OPN, 2011; 
Sekulova et al., 2012; Dietz and O’Neill, 2013). Additionally, reducing 
geographical labour mobility (Jackson, 2009) can have a positive influence 
on well-being and also help us to reduce resource use. 
 
c) Through income control: This category has the same rational as the 
previous one, but instead of presenting a trade-off (time and/or value for 
money), it presents a direct regulation of high wages. This is based on the 
assumption that earning a lower income will lead to a reduction in the 
person’s consumption, essentially on unnecessary products. Measures to 
 achieve this would be reducing excessive executive remuneration packages 
(or making them performance related), or by limiting the maximum wage, 
in a similar approach to a standard minimum wage that many countries 
have (Jackson, 2009; Porritt, 2009). 
 
d) Through the creation of local currencies: The establishment of local 
currencies encourages the purchase and production of local goods and 
services, an increase of community trust, and it reduces their dependence 
on imports (Narberhaus et al., 2011; Dietz and O’Neill, 2013). 
 
e) Through the increase of sustainable options: If public transport 
infrastructures are efficient and sustainable mobility is promoted, people 
are incentivised to trade individual transportation for collective one or for a 
bicycle (UK SDC, 2009; DECC, 2011; EC, 2011; GEC, 2012). 
 
Conclusions 
 
There are some very different views on what consumption should look like in a 
green economy, which range from more radical to more light changes on our 
consumption patterns. For instance, the EC (2011) suggests that if citizens and 
public authorities have the right incentives (e.g. price signals, environmental 
information), they will purchase accordingly and with that stimulate companies 
to innovate and create more resource efficient goods and services. For 
Sekulova et al. (2012), this viewpoint is not enough in the transition to a more 
sustainable economy, because there is the need for less harmful alternatives to 
common products, and the manufacturing of better products is insufficient for 
attaining sustainability. Lorek and Spangenberg (2013) present a different 
viewpoint, pointing out that governments play a crucial role in the transition to 
a more sustainable consumption, and also, that consumers do not have all the 
information they need to make the better choice. These authors also comment 
that non-governmental organizations have a very important role in stimulating 
the civil society, by demonstrating the feasibility of some sustainable options 
and stimulating behaviour changes. The process of learning and sharing the 
knowledge on measures that are effective is also very important for countries 
to help each other (GEC, 2012; Miller and Hopkins, 2013). 
 
In spite of the disagreement of the level in which environmental awareness is 
an effective tool to pursue sustainable consumption patterns, this is one of the 
measures most referred by the authors, as it contributes to empower 
consumers to do better choices. Other measures that are commonly agreed by 
the majority of authors are:  
 the regulation of advertising to increase information and reduce 
deceptiveness;  
 51  :: Pathways to a Green Economy: Deliverable 2.1 
 the importance of greening public spending to promote the more 
sustainable markets and reduce the negative environmental impact of 
public services;  
 the reduction and efficiency on resources use;  
 and the indirect measures of shortening the work hours to increase low 
impact leisure time, and investing in more options to promote 
sustainable mobility. 
 
Another important aspect mentioned by some authors is the need to invest in 
research, so that there is a better understanding of the relationships between 
the following dimensions: education, training, jobs, employment, 
environmental footprint and consumer behaviour (Hatfield-Dodds et al., 2008; 
EC, 2011). New research can also be used to understand how values can be 
shifted, using the knowledge from cognitive science and psychology and 
sociology (Narberhaus et al., 2011). 
 
 
  
 Report 4: Politics and institutions, written by NEF 
These are two separate issues and therefore this paper covers each separately. 
Note that quotes are from the summary sheets not the documents themselves.  
 
1. Is there a political problem? 
Many of the papers ignore the political barriers to achieving a green economy, 
however defined. This may be because the paper has other more specialised 
concerns, or is concerned with aspects of the transformation that are not 
politically controversial, but in some cases it represents, implicitly or explicitly, 
the view that there is no point in a political analysis. This in turn tends to stem 
from one of two very different points of view. These tend to be assumed rather 
than articulated, so the following is our interpretation:- 
1. Conventional politics cannot deliver a green economy. Perhaps there 
needs to be a completely new politics as well as a new economics, but 
whether or not this is the case, it is impossible to predict how this 
would play out; therefore there is no point in a political analysis. Instead 
the first step is the development of a grass roots movement that is 
variously political and practical. The task is to articulate what this 
movement should do in practice and should demand from governments.  
 
2. The investment needed for the shift to a green economy will, like all 
investment and especially innovative investment, generate growth and 
jobs. What is more the investment required is not so great that the 
opportunity cost in terms of lost consumption represents a political 
problem. This is either because the returns to technological innovation 
will be high – or because the scale of change required is not so great. 
(For an example see Hatfield-Dodds et al 2008).  
In each case the point of view rests on an optimistic assumption: that a grass 
roots movement can create a new politics; and that the investment required is 
not so great.  
However those that accept that there is a political problem will adopt a third 
point of view, which we can summarise as follows:- 
3. The level of investment required for the transition to a green economy 
does create an opportunity cost in terms of lost consumption, 
potentially for certain powerful groups and potentially for those least 
able to afford it. This is true both in the developed world and in the 
developing world, where, on the face of it, green policies could hamper 
the drive to reduce poverty. This cost is large enough to create a 
political problem, and while a grass roots movement may be part of the 
solution, it is also necessary to consider the dynamics of conventional 
electoral politics, established power structures, and international 
negotiations between the developing and developed world. Between 
them, these create both active and passive barriers: that is forces 
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pushing in the opposite direction; and an absence of forces pushing in 
the desired direction.  
 
2. What kinds of solution are proposed to the political problem?  
Very broadly, the solutions to these problems proposed in the papers fall into 
two groups: substantive policies which can help build support for a green 
economy; and political strategies and structures which can use or facilitate 
these substantial policies. The various solutions are not mutually exclusive – 
however we identify the disagreements in the next section.  
Substantive policies 
There are four main types of policy advocated: job creation, burden sharing, 
encouraging new conceptions of the good life, and stimulation of locally 
focussed economic activity.  
 Job creation, whether within existing economic structures, or within 
economic structures that have been reformed to better reconcile green 
and commercial objectives 
 
In some cases this is a half-way house to viewpoint 2 above: there is no 
real trade-off, just a mistaken impression that there is one. The task is 
then to correct this. However it can also represent the view that the 
political gains from job creation potentially outweigh the political losses 
from reduced consumption.  
 
Papers that identify this solution, implicitly or explicitly, include: Jaeger 
et al (2011); FAO (2010); the Poverty-Environment Partnership (2012); 
Raingold (2011) – which emphasises the opportunity for competitive 
advantage for countries adopting effective policies; Schwarzer (2013) 
which calls for active industrial policy; OECD (2011) which discusses 
removing skills bottlenecks and new job opportunities; nef and Green 
New Deal Group (2008); and UNEP (2011); ITUC (2012) which identifies 
impacts on “decent jobs” as a key indicator; the CBI (2012) which argues 
green business can drive mainstream growth based on creating a 
comparative advantage for the UK.   
 
UNEP also points out that “making agriculture, forestry, fisheries and 
energy sectors sustainable…[makes] livelihoods in those sectors 
sustainable”, in other words the value lies not just in jobs but in 
sustainable jobs. 
 
The UNEP paper is an example of the halfway house point of view. It 
goes on to question the existence of a trade-off between environmental 
sustainability and economic progress – but implies the belief that there 
is one creates a political problem for sustainability. It also points out 
that there are many examples of sustainable development in the 
developing world. Others reject this view: Lander (2011) specifically 
 rejects the assertion that there is no trade-off between sustainability and 
economic growth. Seaford (2013) points out there can be a trade off 
between consumption and sustainability even if there is none between 
growth and sustainability.  
 
(Lander (2011) also rejects the view that the problem can be dealt with 
by adjusting incentives and calls for structural change. UNEP (2011) 
agrees that command and control is sometimes the most cost effective 
way of achieving change.)  
 
 
 Burden sharing, ie increased equality and security, reinforced social 
solidarity, a focus on meeting essential needs and building human 
capability. 
 
This may be put forward as an end in itself, a moral imperative. However 
it can also be proposed as a political precondition for transition, both in 
domestic politics (since it means that the costs of transition are born by 
an electoral minority), and in international negotiations (potentially 
reinforcing political support for transition within developing countries). 
In the absence of the latter, the green economy can appear to be a rich 
country’s objective. It can be achieved through a range of redistributive 
and ‘predistributive’ measures domestically, as well as through 
international transfers and investment.  
 
Papers that identify this include: Jaeger et al (2011) which identifies 
regional inequality as a problem with business as usual; IHDP (2012) 
which refers to a “passion for equity” and the need for an economy that 
“focuses on enabling people around the world to pursue and achieve 
lives that are meaningful to them” (a concept based on Sen’s theories of 
capabilities); Share the World’s Resources (2011) which similarly calls for 
essential goods and services to be universally accessible; IISD (2011) 
which says the green economy must be “pro-poor”;  ILO (2012) which 
calls for decent work, gender equality, an inclusive economy and 
changes in employment patterns and income distribution; The World 
Bank (2012), which sees the challenge as reconciling the need for 
growth to alleviate poverty and environmental constraints - it also refers 
to the way Iran spent 50% of saving from ending energy subsidies on 
cash transfers benefitting 80% of the population; Jackson (2009) which 
calls for equal per capita resource/emission allowances and for 
incorporating welfare losses from an unequal distribution of income into 
national accounts; the Green Economy Coalition (2012) which calls for 
inclusive economic growth through a range of measures; Share the 
World’s Resources (2011); the Poverty-Environment Partnership (2012) 
which identifies reduced inequality; Porritt (2009) which calls for 
redistributive tax, a living and maximum wage, and investment in 
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housing; the Enquete Commission (2013) which argues social inclusion 
is integral to the green economy; the UK Sustainable Development 
Commission (2009) which identifies fuel poverty, inadequate access to 
transport and poor housing as key targets; Dietz and O’Neill (2013); 
ITUC which calls for “equity within and between countries”, for “the 
rights of workers and trade unions” to be respected, and for the 
“satisfaction of human needs”; Worldwatch Institute (2008) which points 
out that green jobs are not necessarily decent jobs and calls for 
advocates of one to support the other. Seaford (2013) attempts to 
quantify the kind of redistribution that would be necessary in the UK to 
create a majority of winners at the same time as investment in a low 
carbon economy is taking place.  
 
GIZ (2012) calls explicitly for “efforts [to] ensure that the burden of low-
carbon development is spread fairly between poorer and richer 
countries” and concentration on enabling “a pro-poor, ecologically 
sound and low-emission path to development”. Something similar is 
called for in many papers, and while it is clear that this burden sharing 
is needed to solve the developing world political problem, it is itself of 
course part of the developed world political problem which domestic 
burden sharing (and other measures) are designed to solve. 
 
 Encouraging new conceptions of the good life which politicians can 
deliver within environmental limits. 
 
There are two variations of this idea. One is that what people choose to 
consume will change and thus while productivity growth may lead to 
more consumption, this will be decoupled absolutely from 
environmentally damaging production. The other is that people will 
choose to work and consume less – productivity growth will lead to 
more leisure and not to more consumption. In both cases individuals 
can be ‘nudged’ or incentivised to change their choices – or simply 
persuaded. They then care less about a loss of income as compared with 
business as usual.                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
Papers referring to this include: WWF (2012) which calls for policies to 
promote sustainable lifestyles; IHDP (2012) which identifies the “need to 
replace outdated ideas about makes life valuable – about what defines 
well-being”, and relates this closely to everyone having the resources to 
live a meaningful life (see above on burden sharing); Fortschrittsforum 
(2013) which emphasises raising opportunities for everyone; Jackson 
(2009) which calls for changes to the dynamic of status consumption 
while improving quality of life; the Green Economy Coalition (2012) 
which identifies the need to improve wellbeing; Share the World’s 
Resources (2011) which refers to fulfilling lives and “a more holistic 
vision of humanity’s relationship to the natural environment”; Dietz and 
 O’Neill (2013) who argue for promotion of the ‘downshifted’ lifestyle, 
harnessing the power of art, limiting advertising and planned 
obsolescence and cultivation of non-consumerist institutions; and 
Seaford (2013) who also argues for limits to advertising and the 
strengthening of non-consumerist institutions, as well as changes to 
corporate governance to make these changes compatible with 
capitalism. Jackson and Victor (2011) link more jobs to work-time 
reduction policies. Victor (2008) links full employment with shorter 
hours and shorter working life. Dietz and O’Neill (2013) echo this.  
 
 Stimulation of locally focussed economic activity – in other words 
technological and institutional innovation which simultaneously delivers 
environmental performance and better lives. 
 
These innovations tend to encourage local economic activity – that is 
production of goods and services that are consumed locally. The idea is 
that the reduced scale increases individuals’ sense of control and 
reduces the opportunities for an elite to appropriate value, and that 
these (more than) compensate for any reduced economies of scale. They 
also reduce the environmental damage associated with the global 
trading system. This can be delivered through local economic planning.  
To the extent that it is successful it creates a group of people benefiting 
from the green economy and thus an electoral constituency. 
 
The Green Economy Coalition (2012) emphasise the importance of 
community actions and locally owned solutions which deliver “synergies 
between environmental and economic growth aspirations”. Share the 
World’s Resources (2011) refer to flourishing local communities. The 
Poverty-Environment Partnership (2012) refers to “green technologies 
that can benefit the poor” and resilient local economies. IISD (2011) 
argues “the green economy should have its roots at the local level, in 
small, micro and medium sized socio-economic enterprise”. Porritt calls 
for “revitalisation of local economies”. Miller and Hopkins (2013) call for 
“resilient communities – that ‘meet a growing proportion of the local 
economy’s needs for food, energy, building materials and employment 
opportunities from as near as possible’” – involving “democratic 
participation” and “the community invests in itself”. This involves 
building a critical mass of people who support the programme as well as 
their capacities. Ellen McArthur Foundation (2013) also calls for 
activating local communities, including small businesses in local 
clusters.  
 
UNEP (2011) points out that investment in natural assets that are used 
by the poor enhances livelihoods in low income areas. One of the 
biggest opportunities to speed transition to a green economy is to 
invest in the provision of clean water and sanitation.  
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Availability of appropriate financing instruments is critical to this. For 
example loans to save energy (Potsdam Institute 2009).  
Process 
There are four kinds of process solution proposed: pragmatic coalition 
building, political leadership, engagement and narrative development, 
transparency and accountable decision making, and targets, indicators and 
data.  
 Pragmatic coalition building: initial steps have to be (a) where there is 
no sharp trade-off between current and future wellbeing – for example 
where addressing environmental externalities will increase wellbeing 
now (b) creating the conditions so that as time passes further steps can 
be taken without sharp trade-offs. 
 
This is the political strategy that makes use of the other potential 
solutions. It is  set of tools for politicians who wish to encourage the 
transition, either out of conviction or to appeal to a particular electoral 
constituency.  
 
The paper from the World Bank (2012) develops this idea: “local 
strategies are needed because what works depends on local political 
economy”; this requires an “analysis of acceptability and urgency” and 
prioritising accordingly – acceptability is greatest where local benefits 
(jobs, increased safety) offset the transition costs; urgency is where 
there are lock in effects in the absence of action, eg land use planning.  
 
The Dutch Sustainable Development Coalition (2012) call for aligning 
business incentives with social and environmental progress – with 
businesses actively pursuing long term value for a range of 
stakeholders. IISD (2011) also calls for fostering socio-environmental 
enterprises.   
 
 Political leadership and engagement which persuades the electorate and 
other powerful groups to accept sustainability measures; this includes 
the development of new narratives, for example framing the issue as 
one of security, and active engagement with stakeholders.  
Papers which refer to this include: WWF (2012), FAO (2010),IISD (2011), 
World Bank (2012) which calls for framing, nudging and informing and 
social marketing. The World Resources Institute (2012) calls for 
increased public awareness of environmental costs and the economic 
benefits of the green economy. UNWCED (1987) recommends that the 
“notion of security as traditionally understood in terms of political and 
military threats…must be expanded to include the impacts of 
environmental stress.” DEFRA (2011) calls for government provision of 
 information for businesses and consumers to improve decision making. 
Dietz and O’Neill argue for a more accessible message about “steady 
state” and an active debate and academic research on this.  
This also involves working with social partners. The ILO (2012) refers to 
the need for “a social dialogue to help the transition” and “policies that 
result from broad support and active commitment among stakeholders”. 
GIZ (2012) calls for “dialogue between government, private sector and 
civil society stakeholders” to create problem solving strategies and the 
European Commission (2011) wants to see “policy makers…in active 
discussion with business and civil society about the policy conditions 
necessary to overcome the barriers to resource efficiency” as part of an 
effort to mobilise stakeholders to ensure effective co-ordination of 
“policy, financing, investment, research and innovation.” 
Civil society organisations (CSOs) have a role to play too (Narberhaus et 
al 2011) and need to attempt to change values; they need to adopt a 
systems rather than single issue focus and form alliances.  
 Transparency and accountable decision making as part of the process of 
challenging vested interests. 
 
The assumption being made here is that much of the problem is the 
power of vested interests and that transparency will reduce this power, 
in the interests of “poor and marginalised people, future generations, 
and the natural world”, in the words of WWF (2012). 
 
Other papers referring to this include: Poverty-Environment Partnership 
(2012) which calls for “empowered citizens through access to 
information and justice and participation in decision-making” and 
“improved transparency and accountability in the public and private 
sectors.” This is linked to improved land and natural resource property 
rights for the poor. UNEP (2011) also refers to the creation of rights 
which can drive green economic activity (alongside incentives). The 
World Resources Institute (2012) calls for “opening up government 
decision making processes to the public and civil society to ensure 
policies are accountable to the public and not steered by vested 
interests”. Lander (2011) rejects the idea that governments operate as 
rational welfare maximisers for their citizens, ie in reality they are 
influenced by vested interests.  
 
 Targets, indicators and data are part of the armoury of making change 
happen. They are both political tools – forming the centre piece of a 
narrative, in the way that GDP forms the centre piece of the growth 
narrative, and part of the institutional armoury.  
The European Commission (2011) calls for “ambitious resource 
efficiency targets”  and indicators and “a shared objective of the 
international community”. Similarly there are calls for “global political 
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commitment, goals and indicators for sustainable development” (WWF 
2012) and a “goal setting approach” with measurable targets (Griggs et 
al 2013). The UK Parliament Environmental Audit Committee (EAC) 
(2012) also calls for a basket of indicators and a clear trajectory. This 
requires reliable data (WWF 2012) (UNWCED 1987).  
 
3. Disagreements about political problems and solutions 
The disagreements are for the most part manifest in difference of emphasis 
rather than direct argument. Thus the following is our interpretation of these 
disagreements, subject to revision during the interviews (for all there can be 
different answers for different countries). They are not all explicitly stated in 
the papers. There is (naturally) heavy overlap with the social equity and 
consumption themes.  
1. Is there a political problem? 
a. No – the trade off between rising living standards and 
sustainability is small enough to manage 
b. Yes –but the solution just requires people to realise that the 
trade-off between rising living standards and sustainability is 
small enough to manage 
c. Yes – and a mixture of substantive and process solutions are 
needed 
2. Is creating jobs an adequate solution? 
a. Yes – the consumption losses needed are small enough for this to 
be enough 
b. No – the consumption losses are too great for this to be enough 
on its own 
3. Is increased equality within countries a necessary part of the political 
solution? 
a. No – the consumption losses needed are small enough for this to 
be unnecessary 
b. Yes – the consumption losses are too great to be voted for by the 
majority without this kind of redistribution 
4. What does the developed world need to do to burden share and so make 
the politics of sustainability in the developing world easier? (This is not 
covered in any great depth by the paper summaries I have read, but is 
obviously a source of major controversy; we might want to identify more 
and better sources) 
a. Encourage free trade and capital investment or 
b. Develop a strong environmental tariff/import regulation system, 
potentially spending the proceeds on aid 
c. Subsidise technology transfer through large scale investment or 
d. Support investment in locally controlled business and technology 
e. Etc 
5. Does encouraging new conceptions of the good life and other ways of 
encouraging more sustainable consumption have a role to play, not just 
 in itself decoupling or reducing production but in making the measures 
government needs to take more acceptable? 
a. No – government does not need to take measures which reduce 
or change consumption as compared with business as usual 
b. Yes – but with one or more qualifications 
i. It is for civil society not government to do this and/or 
ii. All that is needed is encouraging sustainable consumption, 
not some broader change to people’s ideas about the good 
life 
c. Yes – both government and civil society have a role to play, both 
to encourage sustainable consumption and more broadly to 
change aspirations 
6. More generally, what kind of government communication will be 
important?  
a. Information 
b. Information and more active social marketing 
c. The above plus a strong narrative about the advantages of action 
and the risks associated with inaction 
7. How important is stimulating locally focussed economic activity to build 
support? 
a. Not important – conventional business models will maximise 
welfare within environmental constraints 
b. A useful part of the armoury – but most people will be unaffected 
so it will have relatively little impact on politics 
c. This is potentially a key change and we should look for as many 
opportunities to do this as possible 
8. How should we adopt the World Bank’s prioritisation framework? 
a. Do what is acceptable 
b. Do what is acceptable or urgent and do what it takes to make the 
urgent acceptable 
9. How should the support of business be won for the transition to a green 
economy? 
a. By a combination of dialogue, policy certainty, stable externality 
pricing and regulation and public investment in the research and 
skills needed for the green growth industries of the future 
b. As above but the dialogue needs to be with other social partners 
as well 
c. As above and changes to the rules of the game which mean 
businesses maximise their returns to all stakeholders (and 
therefore support a different set of policies) 
d. The support cannot and should not be won; instead the power of 
business should be made clear and reduced 
10. How important are transparency and accountability to counter vested 
interests 
a. Quite – but winning public support is equally or more important 
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b. Fundamental – if we can deal with vested interests, public 
support will be relatively easy to win 
11. How important are indicators for political purposes? 
a. A red herring 
b. Very important 
 
4. Institutional issues and solutions 
Whereas the political solutions are designed to create the desire for change, 
institutional solutions are designed to translate that desire into action. Change 
is needed at the national and international level. The indicator development 
already referred to will support this.  
 Policy integration and policy certainty at the national level: policy for 
the green economy needs to be integrated into mainstream economic 
policy and thus policy coherence achieved – however there are also calls 
for separate units separated from day to day government designed to 
create policy certainty.  
Environmental issues should not be considered in separate departments 
in national governments: according to UNWCED (1987)
xix
 “The central 
economic and sectoral ministries should be given responsibility for the 
quality of those parts of the human environment affected by their 
decisions”. “Ecological dimensions of policy should be considered at the 
same time as the economic, trade, energy, agricultural and other 
dimensions.” IISD (2011) emphasises the need for policy coherence. The 
report by Brainpool (2013) also calls for more integrated policy making 
as essential to sustainability. The Poverty-Environment Partnership 
(2012) also calls for integrating green economy objectives into planning 
and broader economic policy making as does OECD (2011).  
The EAC (2012) calls by contrast for dedicated units to examine the 
relationship between growth, prosperity and quality of life, to engage 
with business and civil society, to monitor progress and to set tariffs 
and charges (and so create certainty for investors). The latter requires a 
non-partisan approach. The importance of policy certainty for 
investment is emphasised by Deutscher Nachhaltigkeisrat (2013). A 
similar emphasis on clarity and predictability in infrastructure planning 
is made by DEFRA (2011): rapid, predictable, accountable, transparent 
planning system is needed for infrastructure. 
All this requires capacity building within government so that rational 
decisions can be made (UNEP 2010). 
 Reformed international institutions: these need to be reformed to a 
greater or lesser extent to facilitate the transition to a green economy 
                                           
xix
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 UNWCED (1987) calls for “International agencies concerned with 
development lending, trade regulation, agricultural development... to 
take the environmental effects of their work into account”, and 
international law needs developing. FAO (2010) also refers to 
international frameworks, international law and national law 
harmonisation eg over the commons.  Other papers calling for similar 
reform of institutions include Griggs et al (2013). UNEP (2011) echoes 
this emphasis on international agreements and processes, and calls for 
WTO Doha round to promote a green economy. Pardee Centre (2011) 
argues for “reform of macro-economic policy instruments and structures 
as they bear on international trade and finance” – although not for any 
fundamental reform of institutions which is a distraction – incremental 
reform is best.  
There is also a call for a “stronger voice for poor and marginalised in 
international institutions” (WWF 2012), for “the negotiating capacity of 
developing countries vis a vis transnational companies [to be] 
strengthened” (UNWCED - 1987). Similar calls are made by Share the 
World’s Resources (2011). 
In parallel with such changes, there needs to be policy coherence 
towards aid to developing countries across OECD countries, supported 
by leading NGOs (Poverty-Environment Partnership 2012). 
5. Disagreements about institutional solutions 
 
12. What is the right balance between integrating green economy policy 
making into economic policy making generally and having dedicated, 
powerful units with a remit to create permanent change and policy 
certainty? 
a. If you do the former you don’t need the latter 
b. The specialist units should take over the key levers of economic 
policy 
c. Integration is not as important as having dedicated units. 
13. What reform of international institutions is needed? 
a. None worth speaking about 
b. Incremental reforms which integrate green economy objectives 
into existing processes 
c. Only significant change will make a difference, and should be 
part of a new international settlement between developing and 
developed countries. 
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Report 5: The national and international 
improvements to social justice that will underpin 
this politics, written by written by The Centre for 
Environmental and Sustainability Research (CENSE) 
1. Introduction 
A green economy can be defined as one that is inclusive and focuses on 
enabling people to pursue and achieve meaningful lives while minimising the 
negative impacts that their activities have on the environment (EC, 2012; UNU-
IHDP, 2012;). This economy needs to safeguard human health and well-being, 
provide jobs, reduce inequalities and invest and preserve natural capital. The 
transition to a green economy should also  be socially just to ensure a fair 
distribution of the costs and benefits (Raingold, 2011; EC, 2012).  
 
What does it mean to have a socially just transition? Two main aspects of social 
justice are intra and intergenerational equity. The principle of intergenerational 
equity is based on the responsibility of preserving a legacy of resources and 
environmental quality to future generations. Norton (2002), groups the issues 
associated with intergenerational equity into four categories:  
1. The intergenerational trade-offs: how should the needs of future 
generations be balanced against the needs of present generations - this 
is more significant in the face of uncertainty and subjectivity about 
future needs;  
 
2. The distance issue: how far we should consider the needs of future 
generations – this is highly dependent on individual perceptions and 
concerns; 
 
3. The knowledge issue: how much do we know about future generation’s 
needs – this can be viewed in terms of wants, desires, needs, as well as 
rights or entitlements;  
 
4. The typology of effects: how do we account for some of the 
characteristics of the natural systems, such as irreversibility and the 
inherent value of natural capital – this is related to the extent and type 
of precautions taken for the conservation of natural capital.  
 
It is crucial to ensure a sustainable future for the generations to come and 
manage the economy in a long-term perspective (WCED, 1987; UK SDC, 2009; 
GEC, 2012). This has to be a global concern and effort, so it is important to 
invest in social dialogue on society’s collective future and responsibility to the 
planet (OPN, 2011). 
 
Intragenerational equity translates the spatial and social dimensions of equity. 
Fundamental aspects are the distribution of benefits and costs of 
 environmental goods and services, as well as the access to resources. This 
means that the responsibilities of sustainable development should be spread 
fairly between poorer and richer countries, as well as the social and economic 
co-benefits (GIZ, 2012). These co-benefits can be multiple: security of natural 
resources; freedom and ability to pursue meaningful lives; building trust in the 
governments and businesses; inclusiveness and participation in decision-
making; guarantees of health care and education system; decent job 
guarantees; and a fair distribution of income and wealth, among others (GEC, 
2012; UNU-IHDP, 2012; Dietz and O’Neill, 2013). 
 
Poverty is a central issue when talking about social justice. Poverty is at the 
same time a major cause of global environmental problems and also a 
consequence of them (WCED, 1987). Fighting poverty in a green economy 
means not only to invest in job creation but also on preserving natural capital, 
in which people depend on, and investing in the clean development of low-
income countries (UNEP, 2011). Therefore, the transition to a green economy 
entails the eradication of extreme poverty, and to that it is crucial to share 
financial, technical and natural resources between rich and poor nations (SWR, 
2012). 
 
In the next sections the main drivers for social justice are presented and 
discussed. In section 2 we discuss what can be done in the private sector to 
ensure that the employees and the rest of the society are being considered on 
companies’ strategies to the green economy. In section 3 we explore what can 
be done in the public sector, namely if the actions carried are aimed at: 
distributing benefits and costs more fairly between people and nations,  
fighting poverty,  aiding the development of  countries in need,  promoting 
social inclusion  and enhancing global and national governance. In section 4 
we discuss an indirect way of promoting social justice, by creating new ways of 
measuring progress. Section 5 concludes this report, presenting the major 
challenges for enhancing social justice. 
 
2. Private sector contributions 
The business sector plays a major role in supporting a socially fair transition to 
a green economy. It should guarantee that  employees are valued and that the 
company’s economic activities are a positive contribute to society in general. 
The value that is created with stakeholder engagement, whether playing the 
role of costumers, a local community or the government, is essential to assure 
that companies’ performance is sustainable (DSGC, 2012). The following 
groups of measures are meant to summarize what can be done by the private 
sector to enhance social justice. 
a) Ensure decent labour conditions: The employees should have 
opportunities to do training and to gain work experience in a diverse 
workforce and under good working conditions (DSGC, 2012). Furthermore, 
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the green job creation that is implicit to the transition to a green economy 
has to be accompanied by adequate wages, safe working conditions, job 
security, reasonable career prospects and workers’ rights (FAO, 2010; GEC, 
2012).  
b) Changing the structure of companies: Some authors propose that 
business should encompass a more inclusive understanding of ‘value’ in 
their value chains?, although in different degrees. On a general basis, 
businesses operate with a shareholder structure, and one perspective is 
inserting the company in a wider network of stakeholders, learning with 
their engagement and making better-informed decisions (UNEP, 2012). A 
more radical viewpoint is to abandon the corporate structure as a form of 
productive organization and establish more employee-owned companies, 
while transforming others into cooperatives (Sekulova et al., 2012; Dietz 
and O’Neill, 2013). 
c) Build competitiveness and resilience in community: Business should not 
only consider stakeholder engagement to make decisions, but also promote 
the resilience of their communities. In this context, businesses should be 
more concerned with creating wealth in communities, by promoting the 
development and deployment of new and innovative products and services, 
particularly to help vulnerable people in developing countries and also 
ensure that these technologies are appropriate and affordable (UNGC et al., 
2011). Additionally, companies can partner with local communities to 
preserve natural resources on which they both are dependent to exist 
(UNGC et al., 2011). 
d) Equitable development for business: to build a green economy there 
should be a special focus on small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which 
are more numerous than the large ones, particularly considering that SMEs 
might lose competitive advantage more easily than large companies in the 
process of transition. For this, financial markets should be reformed to take 
a longer-term view in financial accounting and investment decisions and 
enable smaller, value-based banks to become more numerous so they can 
help stimulate the SMEs and community initiatives that will help the 
transition (GEC, 2012). It is also important to explore how the financial 
sustainability of SMEs can be strengthened and establish information- and 
experience-sharing mechanisms that can support their growth (Creech et 
al., 2012). 
3. Public sector contributions 
3.1  Fair distribution of benefits and costs 
The objective is to achieve a fair distribution of benefits and costs of 
environmental goods and services, as well as ensure the access of all members 
of society to resources. There are several issues associated such as: 
sustainable food security, the way public goods are managed to ensure a fair 
distribution of rights, the way environmental and social costs are distributed, 
the equality in resource and emissions caps, the way wealth and income is 
distributed, the way international trade is conducted, among many others. A 
few measures that can be taken to achieve this are: 
 a) Fair access to resources: Guarantee access to natural resources and their 
services, e.g. freshwater, soil fertility; Achieve universal access to clean 
water and basic sanitation, and ensure efficient allocation through 
integrated water-resource management; promote the access to clean 
energy; universal and affordable access to clean energy that minimizes 
local pollution, health impacts and mitigates global warming; Sharing 
knowledge globally will assure greater mutual understanding and create 
greater willingness to share global resources equitably; assure universal 
access to basic goods and services that are essential for life and health, 
through effective public services which replace private sector alternatives 
that the poor often cannot afford; Global interdependence of resources 
requires nations to co-operate more effectively, share their natural and 
economic resources, and ensure that global governance mechanisms reflect 
and directly support our common needs and rights. Agreements should be 
promoted to assure national and international access to natural resources 
so that resources can be shared equitably and sustainably managed; Local 
rights and capacities: there should be a strengthening of land and natural 
resource ownership and access rights of poor and marginalized groups. 
(WCED, 1987; SWR, 2011; PEP, 2012; TEEB, 2012; Griggs et al., 2013). 
b) Sustainable food security: Fight hunger and achieve long-term food 
security — including better nutrition — through sustainable systems of 
production, distribution and consumption; Most developing nations need 
more effective incentive systems to encourage food production; Food 
security requires attention to questions of distribution, since hunger often 
arises from lack of purchasing power rather than lack of available food; 
Food security is also associated to nutrition and sustainable agriculture 
(WCED, 1897; UN, 2012; Griggs et al., 2013).  
c) Managing public goods:  Some common resources’ use rights are 
insufficiently defined, and others are difficult to be enforced, for example in 
the high seas, some mangroves, coral reefs, flood plains and forests 
without clear ownership; The international community should seek to 
create, and enhance existing regimes (including ratification of these) to 
ensure that the oceans, outer space and Antarctica are shared fairly and 
peacefully; Establish payments for environmental services – this will 
promote a fair sharing of benefits and costs of ecosystems services; The 
equality on global rights to the global commons can be promoted by a 
reduction in wealth inequality within and between countries. (WCED, 1987; 
FAO, 2010; Jenkins and Simms, 2012; WB, 2012). 
d) Sharing environmental and social costs: International agreement to 
internalize environmental and social costs on their products; the costs of 
transition towards a low-carbon economy, in the effort to tackle climate 
change, should be shared fairly by the government, business and 
individuals (DECC, 2011; Dietz and O’Neill, 2013;).  
e) Equality in resource and emission caps: Identifying clear resource caps 
and emission caps for all sector of the economy and establishing reduction 
targets under those caps: establish equal per capita allowances on resource 
and emission caps (Jackson, 2009). 
f) Wealth and income distribution: Limiting the degree of inequality in the 
distribution of income, for example establishing maximum and minimum 
limits to personal income, the promotion of a smaller difference between 
the wages of high and low earners, as well as a maximum limit to personal 
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wealth; Increase gender equality; Redistribution of wealth and income 
through the use of taxes and social transfers (e.g. welfare payments); 
Wealth redistribution from North to South to alleviate poverty and to ensure 
that every nation can provide access to essential services such as 
education, healthcare and utilities for all their citizens; the rolling back of 
privatisation and the intellectual property rights regime; Sharing the 
available work so that more people can have an income (Daly, 1992; 
Jackson, 2009; OPN, 2011; SWR, 2011; Dietz and O’Neill, 2013; 
Fortschrittsforum, 2013). 
g) Value informal work: Explore the potential and the value of informal and 
voluntary work at the levels of household and community, as well as 
amateur and social-enterprise-based (Sekulova et al., 2012) 
h) Tax legislation and application: Revise income tax structures to allow a 
better distribution of benefits and costs; Introduce a more progressive tax 
system; Reduce tax avoidance; Establish taxes for financial transactions; 
Avoid tax havens to promote social equality and fairness (Jackson, 2009; 
Porritt, 2009; GP, 2010; OPN, 2011; EAC, 2012; Fortschrittsforum, 2013). 
i) International trade: G20 members should develop co-ordinated efforts to 
their commitment to an open trading system and refrain from 
discriminatory provisions in national stimulus packages; Reverse the trends 
towards depressed commodity prices and protectionism; Increase the 
negotiating capacity of developing countries regarding transnational 
companies, so these countries can secure property tights and 
environmental concerns; Develop trade rules that promote liberalization, as 
well as non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading systems; There 
are some concerns that industrialised countries could establish new non-
tariff trade barriers in a green economy context, e.g. by dictating stricter 
environmental standards (WCED, 1987; PIK and GRI-LSE, 2009; GIZ, 2012; 
UN, 2012). 
 
3.2 Development aid to developing countries 
International cooperation for development is still an area that needs plenty of 
attention. In a green economy context, development aid should be focused on 
helping low-income countries to achieve better living conditions for their 
populations in a sustainable way, and also for them to build resilience to face 
future environmental challenges. Additionally, it is crucial to have in mind that 
a different development model should be promoted for developing countries, 
one that is built by local people with the financial help and knowledge from 
more developed nations. A few measures that can be taken to achieve this are: 
a) Increase finance aid: assistance for small island developing states; support 
for least developed countries and landlocked least developed countries; 
enhance financial support from developed to some developing countries, to 
meet their commitments under agreements regarding Official Development 
Assistance; efforts to improve the quality of aid; In the area of debt 
financing efforts should be made to relief unsustainable debt levels, and, 
where appropriate, debt restructuring for developing countries; fighting 
corruption (Jackson, 2009; DEFRA, 2010; GP, 2010; SWR, 2012; UN, 2012). 
 b) Increase technology transfer: ensuring wide diffusion and international 
transfer agreements of green technologies and practices, as well as the 
corresponding know-how and assistance, by reducing barriers to trade and 
foreign direct investment protection of property rights; cooperative action 
on technology innovation, research and development (WCED, 1987; PIK and 
GRI-LSE, 2009; OECD, 2011; UN, 2012; ). 
c) Support the ecological transition in developing countries: funding 
mechanisms that promote investment in renewable energy, energy 
efficiency, resource efficiency, low-carbon infrastructures and the 
protection of ‘carbon sinks’ and biodiversity; payment of a carbon levy by 
richer nations on imports from developing countries; promote fair trade; 
promote the rights for developing countries; taxes on financial institution 
transfers to pay for sustainable development measures; assistance to 
change energy use patterns (WCED, 1987; Jackson, 2009; GP, 2010). 
d) Catalyse innovation in least developed countries: internationally 
sponsored networks of business incubators; significantly scaled-up 
innovation activity via competitive grant; dedicated funds to de-risk 
entrepreneurial investments and stimulate intellectual property sharing 
(GGGI, 2012). 
e) Promote capacity building: strengthening technical and scientific 
cooperation including North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation; 
globally representative participation in sustainable development 
assessment and monitoring, to enhance national capabilities and the 
quality of research for decision- and policy-making processes; developed 
countries to share knowledge with developing countries on how to develop 
resource-efficient, inclusive economies (UN, 2012). 
f) New development paradigms: Implement a different development model 
for developing countries, to adopt a more sustainable path instead of 
following the same unsustainable path of most rich countries; rethink of 
Western notions of ‘development’ to move beyond the obsession with 
purely market-based economies; Develop a more holistic vision of 
humanity’s relationship to the natural environment (SWR, 2011; UNU-IHDP, 
2012). 
g) Promote the harmonization of international policies and support: 
ensure coherence of aid, trade, technology and other policies to support 
inclusive green economy transitions in developing countries; development 
agencies can provide harmonized support for country-led efforts to define 
and implement a national strategy for transitioning to an inclusive green 
economy (PEP, 2012). 
 
3.3 Fight poverty  
One of the main objectives of a green economy is tackling poverty and 
ensuring the basic needs of populations. For some authors, a green economy 
must be a ‘pro poor’ approach  (Creech, 2011; GIZ, 2012; PEP, 2012;). A few 
measures that can be taken to achieve this are: 
a) Job creation and support: increase the value given by society to non-
formal, unpaid, low-productive working time; facilitation of work-sharing; 
 69  :: Pathways to a Green Economy: Deliverable 2.1 
guaranteed jobs provided by the state, to help people that are unable to 
find employment; employer job subsidy measures; support for self-
employment ( Victor, 2008;  Jackson, 2009; Porritt, 2009; Jackson and 
Victor, 2011; OPN, 2011; Sekulova et al., 2012; Dietz and O’Neill, 2013;). 
b) Ensure decent jobs and labour guarantees: promote decent wages, career 
prospects, job security, occupational health and safety, and worker rights; 
income support and social protection measures, to help limit the downside 
adjustment process for workers most likely to be affected by the shift 
towards a greener economy; ensure a stable and relatively equal earning 
distribution; stricter regulation of exemptions to the labour code; 
development of a more general work insurance that copes better with the 
more flexible and more disrupted working life situations (Victor, 2008; WI, 
2008; ILO, 2012; WB, 2012; ECGB, 2013; Fortschrittsforum, 2013;) 
c) Ensure personal financial help: creation of a citizen’s minimum income 
level; promote universal child-care benefits; create protective measures 
aimed at maintaining a minimum safety net, such as targeted transfers, 
social assistance, social housing, in-kind support, means-tested income 
supplements; payments for environmental services to benefit the poor 
(Victor, 2008;  Jackson and Victor, 2011; OPN, 2011; WB, 2012; Dietz and 
O’Neill, 2013) 
d) Improve local economics and neighbourhood quality: promote 
community social and economic development, community development 
corporations, rural sustainability, safe communities, etc.; local support for 
culture, sports and recreation; improvement of social capital (Victor, 2008). 
e) Promote community resilience: greening agriculture, forestry, freshwater, 
fisheries and energy sectors will make livelihoods in those sectors 
sustainable (UNEP, 2011). 
f) Emergency poverty relief: Implement an international program of 
emergency relief to rapidly eliminate hunger and unnecessary deprivation, 
led by the UN; create a new definition of what constitutes a humanitarian 
crisis to include any person who exists in a life-threatening condition of 
poverty (SWR, 2011). 
 
3.4 Social inclusion 
A green economy must be inclusive and ensure that there is universal access to 
basic services. A few measures that can be taken to achieve this are: 
a) Access to education: optimising vocational training systems whilst 
considering new, environment related employment opportunities; 
educational outcomes for disadvantaged groups; Training courses for older 
employees; opportunities for lifelong learning skills (; Victor, 2008; 
Jackson, 2009; GIZ, 2012; TEEB, 2012; Dietz and O’Neill, 2013; 
Fortschrittsforum, 2013; Griggs et al., 2013). 
b) Access to the labour market: provision of information and active 
counselling; development of education, skills training, literacy and 
numeracy training, language training, orientation and settlement, 
information technology training (ECGB, 2013) 
 c) Access to health and care services: assure universal access to basic health 
and care services; measures to address drug issues, teen pregnancy, and 
mental health; provision of universal child care; better provision of care for 
the elders (Victor, 2008; Fortschrittsforum, 2013; Griggs et al., 2013;). 
d) Access to housing: assure universal access to housing; investments in 
quality of housing (Victor, 2008; Griggs et al., 2013). 
e) Promoting social cohesion and solidarity: promoting solidarity, including 
citizenship education, cross-cultural sensitivity and education; framework 
legislation establishing rights and freedoms; promote anti-discrimination 
measures and celebrate diversity (Victor, 2008; GP, 2010). 
 
3.4 Governance 
The construction of a green economy can benefit significantly from a collective 
process rather then be concentrated in the hands of decisions-makers. The 
participation of diverse stakeholders in a democratic and transparent process 
can have multiple advantages such as the increase of: information exchange, 
acceptance, and the speed of the transition towards a green economy. A few 
measures that can be taken to achieve this are: 
1. Stakeholders inclusion: ensure that different voices are heard in the 
processes of decision-making, for example by the creation of a ‘Green 
Economy Council’ to engage both business and civil society; creation of 
institutional and legal means to involve civil society, non-governmental 
organizations, scientists and industry in decisions about sustainable 
development; promote active partnerships between governments, public 
institutions and the private sector; ensure that tribal and indigenous people 
have a decisive voice in formulating policies about resource extraction and 
use in their regions; greater representation for poor and marginalised 
people; promote inter-institutional cooperation, as well as appropriate 
decision-making and implementation mechanisms (WCED, 1987; EAC, 
2012; GIZ, 2012; WWF, 2012;). 
2. Promote a global commitment on green economy: global political 
commitment towards goals and indicators for sustainable development; 
better integration of the concerns of poor and marginalised nations in 
international institutions, ensuring that the global economy can serve the 
interests and securing basic needs of all people; ensure that global 
governance mechanisms reflect and directly support humanity’s common 
needs and rights, for instance through agreements over national and 
international access to natural resources (SWR, 2011; WWF, 2012). 
3. Promote democracy and public information transparency: promote 
democracy, good governance and the rule of law, at the national and 
international levels; introduce proportional representation for all elections; 
promote high standards and information for all goods and services; access 
to broadcast media (GP, 2010; UN, 2012). 
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4. Promote new valuation techniques 
The pathway to a green economy can be better assessed if new metrics and 
indicators are developed. Some of the existing and commonly used indicators 
are not enough to a proper evaluation of sustainable development, namely 
improvements are needed in the assessment of the quality and availability of 
natural resources, as well as the evaluation of social conditions. A few 
measures that can be taken to achieve this are: 
a) Develop new metrics: Adopting alternative valuation techniques (different 
from the traditional, monetary valuation techniques) that are able to 
capture more adequately value human, social and natural capital; 
Alternatives to financial measures like GDP and income per capita as the 
main yardsticks for national and social progress; Develop new measures of 
economic growth and metrics of saving and inclusive wealth; Develop 
measures of social fairness (SWR, 2011; EAC, 2012; UNEP, 2012; NCC, 
2013; ) 
b) Revise national accounts: Incorporate the real welfare losses from having 
an unequal distribution of income; Account for non-market services (e.g. 
domestic labour, voluntary care); Develop a national well-being accounts 
and integrate them systematically into the existing national accounting 
framework (Jackson, 2009). 
c) Measuring capabilities and flourishing: Define an appropriate 
measurement framework for a lasting prosperity, which includes a 
systematic assessment of people’s capabilities for flourishing across the 
nation (healthy life expectancy, educational participation, trust, community 
resilience, participation in the life of society); Creating maps for economic 
development that properly account for the environmental, social and 
economic challenges of modern times, both in high-income and low-income 
nations (Dietz and O’Neill, 2013; Jackson, 2009). 
 
5. Conclusions 
For ensuring social justice in a green economy, there are a few major 
challenges that need to be addressed:: 
Internal and external pressures to exploit natural resources (WCED, 1987; 
FAO, 2010; SWR, 2011): most developing countries face enormous economic 
pressures from powerful groups to overexploit their environmental resources, 
since competing destructive resource usages are highly lucrative. This problem 
is particularly significant in the situation where resources tenure or use rights 
are insufficiently defined or enforced, such as in the high seas, some 
mangroves, coral reefs, flood plains and forests without clear ownership.  One 
possible solution for this problem is to foster international cooperation in 
creating conditions that allow an equitable sharing of the world’s resources. 
Lack of global governance (FAO, 2010; WWF, 2012): traditional processes of 
decision-making are insufficiently accountable and transparent; this enables 
powerful groups interested in maintaining the status quo to have a 
disproportionate influence, at the expense of poor and marginalised people, 
 future generations and the natural world. There is a strong need to enhance 
governance at many levels from local to national and global, that is able to 
promote a more sustainable and integrated development. 
Economic challenges (SWR, 2011; PEP, 2012): transaction costs to a green 
economy can be very high; although longer-term impacts of achieving an 
inclusive green economy will be generally beneficial, particularly to the less 
fortunate members of society, the shorter-term impacts may be negative, such 
as: fossil fuel and energy price rises, increase in use of biofuels, decarbonising 
urban space and settlements; unwillingness of governments to regulate the 
power and influence of big business in terms of production, what has great 
impacts on the poor (e.g. in the form of climate change) and widens inequality 
further. 
Development aid challenges (SWR, 2011): generally governments favour a pro 
free-market ideology over prioritising poverty alleviation, so aid is often tied to 
political, ideological and commercial interests that benefit the richer countries. 
Comprehensive solutions that address the structural causes of poverty and 
inequality are often dismissed by policymakers in the North as ‘unrealistic’ 
given the political and economic realities they face. The outcome is that 
multilateral institutions continue to promote policies that increase global 
inequality, with the justification that more economic growth will solve the 
poverty problem, and in some cases not enough ‘real aid’ is given to those 
how need the most. 
 
  
 73  :: Pathways to a Green Economy: Deliverable 2.1 
Annex 3 :: Literature consulted  
Acosta, A. (2010). El Buen Vivir en el camino del post-desarrollo: Una lectura 
desde la Constitución de Montecristi. Policy Paper, 9.  
 
Allen, C., & Clouth, S. (2012). A Guidebook to the Green Economy Issue 1: 
Green Economy, Green Growth, and Low-Carbon Development–History, 
Definitions and a Guide to Recent Publications. United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs. 
 
Bapna, M. & Talberth, J. (2011). What is a green economy? Retrieved from 
http://www.wri.org/blog/qa-what-green-economy-0  
 
Bartelmus, P. (2010). Use and usefulness of sustainability economics. 
Ecological Economics, 69(11), pp. 2053-2055. 
 
Brundtland, G. (1987). Our common future: Report of the 1987 World 
Commission on Environment and Development. United Nations. 
 
Bundeskoordination Internationalismus (2012). After the failure of the green 
economy: 10 these of a critique of the green economy. 
 
CBS (2011). Environmental accounts of the Netherlands 2011. The Hague: 
Statistics Netherlands. 
 
Centre for Alternative Technology (2010). Zero Carbon Britain: Rethinking the 
Future. Centre for Alternative Technology. 
 
Centre for the Advancement of the Steady State Economy (n.d.). Definition. 
Retrieved from http://steadystate.org/discover/definition/ [accessed on 10
th
 
November 2013]. 
 
Confederation of British Industry (2012). The Colour of Growth: Maximising the 
potential of green business. Confederation of British Industry. 
 
Confederation of Resources for Global Democracy (2012). Commons: A model 
for managing natural resources. Confederation of Resources for Global 
Democracy. 
 
Creech, H. (2011). SEED Symposium: The Green Economy – Accelerating the 
transition. International Institute for Sustainable Development. 
  
Creech, H., Huppé, G.A., Paas, L., Voora, V. (2012). Social and Environmental 
Enterprises in the Green Economy: Supporting sustainable development and 
poverty eradication on the ground—Analysis of a 3-year study for policy-
makers. SEED initiative and International Institute for Sustainable Development. 
 
Dalal-Clayton, B. (2013). Turning green the strategic way: the role and 
potential of strategic environmental assessment in securing a green economy. 
International Institute for Environment and Development. 
 
Daly, H. E. (1991). Steady-state economics: with new essays. California: Island 
Press. 
 
Daly, H. E. (1992). Allocation, distribution, and scale: towards an economics 
that is efficient, just, and sustainable. Ecological Economics, 6(3), pp.185-193. 
 
Daly, H. E. (1996). Beyond growth: the economics of sustainable development. 
Boston: Beacon Press. 
 
DECC (2011). The Carbon Plan 2011. Department for Energy and Climate 
Change, UK Government. 
 
DEFRA (2010). Economic Growth and the Environment. Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, UK Government. 
 
DEFRA (2011). Enabling the Transition to a Green Economy: Government and 
business working together. Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs, UK Government. 
 
DEFRA (2010). Government economic service review of the economics of 
sustainable development. Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 
UK Government. 
 
DEFRA (2011). The natural choice: securing the value of nature. Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, UK Government. 
 
Deutsche Nachhaltigkeitsrat (2013). Sustainability: Made in Germany, the 
second review by a group of international peers. Deutsche Nachhaltigkeitsrat. 
 
Diefenbacher, H., Held, B., Rodenhäuser, D., & Zieschank, R. (2013). NWI 2.0–
Weiterentwicklung und Aktualisierung des Nationalen Wohlfahrtsindex. 
Bundesministerium fur Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit. 
 75  :: Pathways to a Green Economy: Deliverable 2.1 
Dietz, R., & O'Neill, D. W. (2013). Enough is enough: Building a sustainable 
economy in a world of finite resources. London: Routledge. 
 
Dittrich, M., Giljum, S., Lutter, S., & Polzin, C. (2012). Green economies around 
the world. Implications of resource use for development and the environment. 
Sustainable Europe Research Institute. 
 
Edenhofer, O., & Stern, N. (2009). Towards a global green recovery: 
Recommendations for immediate G20 action. Potsdam Institute for Climate 
Impact Research. 
 
Elliott, L., Murphy, R., Juniper, T., Legget, J., Hines, C., Secrett, C., Lucas, C., 
Simms, A. & Pettifor, A. (2008). A green new deal. New economics foundation. 
 
ESCAP (2010). Financing an inclusive and green future: A supportive financial 
system and green growth. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific. 
 
European Climate Foundation (2010). Roadmap 2050: A practical guide to a 
prosperous, low-carbon Europe. European Climate Foundation. 
 
European Commission (2007). Measuring progress, the true wealth, and the 
well-being of nations. European Commission. 
 
Eurpean Commission (2011). Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe. 
European Commission. 
 
European Environment Agency (2013). Towards a green economy in Europe: EU 
environmental policy targets and objectives 2010-2050. European Environment 
Agency. 
 
European Environmental Bureau (2012). Work programme and budget 2012. 
European Environmental Bureau. 
 
EXIOPOL (2011) A new environmental accounting framework using externality 
data and input-output for policy analysis. EXIOPOL. 
 
FAO (2010). Payments for environmental services within the context of the 
green economy. Food and Agriculture  Organization of the United Nations. 
 
 Fay, M. (2012). Inclusive Green Growth: The Pathway to Sustainable 
Development. World Bank. 
 
Frederick S. (2011). Beyond Rio+ 20: governance for a green economy. Pardee 
Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future. Boston: Boston University. 
 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (n.d.). Nachhaltigkeit gestalten. Retrieved from 
http://www.fes-sustainability.org/de [accessed 10th November 2013]. 
 
Fulai, S., Flomenhoft, G., Downs, T. J., Grande‐ Ortiz, M., Graef, D., Scholtens, 
B. & Hermann, S. (2011). Is the concept of a green economy a useful way of 
framing policy discussions and policymaking to promote sustainable 
development? Natural Resources Forum, 35(1), pp. 63-72.  
 
GIZ (2012). Green economy – the economy of the future. Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit. 
 
Green for All (2011). Amplifying the green economy. Green for All. 
 
Green Economy Coalition (2012). The green economy pocketbook: the case for 
action. Green Economy Coalition. 
 
Griggs, D., Stafford-Smith, M., Gaffney, O., Rockström, J., Öhman, M. C., 
Shyamsundar, P.  & Noble, I. (2013). Policy: Sustainable development goals for 
people and planet. Nature, 495(7441), pp. 305-307. 
 
Harvey, H. & Segafredo, L. (2011). Policies that work: How to build a low 
emissions economy. Climate Works Foundation. 
 
Hines, C., and Lucas, C. (2008). A green new deal. Policy Matters, 16, pp.214-
218. 
 
Hultman, N., Eis, J. & Sierra, K. (2012). International Actions to Support Green 
Growth Innovation Goals. Global Green Growth Institute. 
 
ILO (2012). Working Towards Sustainable Development. International Labour 
Organization. 
 
IN-STREAM (2011). Results and conclusion for policy makers. Linking 
Sustainability Indicators with Policy Making. 
 
 77  :: Pathways to a Green Economy: Deliverable 2.1 
International Trade Union Confederation (2012). Growing green and decent 
jobs. International Trade Union Confederation. 
 
Jackson, A. & Dyson, B. (2012). Modernising Money: Why Our Monetary System 
Is Broken and How It Can Be Fixed. London: Positive Money. 
 
Jackson, T. (2009). Prosperity without growth: Economics for a finite planet. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Jackson, T., & Victor, P. (2011). Productivity and work in the ‘green economy’: 
Some theoretical reflections and empirical tests. Environmental Innovation and 
Societal Transitions, 1(1), pp.101-108. 
 
Jaeger, C., Paroussos, L., Mangalagiu, D., Kupers, R., Mandel, A., & Tabara, J. D. 
(2012). A new growth path for Europe: Generating prosperity and jobs in the 
low-carbon economy. European Climate Forum. 
 
Kamp-Roelands, N., Balkenende, J. P. & van Ommen, P. (2012). Towards 
sustainable growth business models. Dutch Sustainable Growth Coalition. 
 
Karbassi, L., Park, J., Kasten, T., Munang, R., Coleman, H., Putt del Pino, S., 
Metzger, E., Powitt, S. & Hopkins, N. (2011). Adapting for a green economy. 
United Nations Global Compact, United Nations Environment Program, Oxfam 
and World Resources Institute. 
 
Lander, E. (2011). The green economy: the wolf in sheep's clothing. 
Transnational Institute. 
 
Lawn, P., & Clarke, M. (2010). The end of economic growth? A contracting 
threshold hypothesis. Ecological Economics, 69(11), pp.2213-2223. 
 
Lorek, S., & Spangenberg, J. H. (2014). Sustainable consumption within a 
sustainable economy–beyond green growth and green economies. Journal of 
Cleaner Production, 63, pp.33-44. 
 
Makower, J. (2013). State of Green Business 2013. GreenBiz Group. 
 
Narberhaus, M., Ashford, C., Buhr, M., Hanisch, F., Sengun, K., Tunçer, B. 
(2011). Effective change strategies for the Great Transition. Smart CSOs. 
 
 Natural Capital Committee (2013). The State of Natural Capital: Towards a 
framework for measurement and valuation. Natural Capital Committee. 
 
One Planet Network (2011). Scenarios for a One Planet Europe. One Planet 
Network. 
 
OECD (2011). Towards green growth. Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development. 
 
Party, G. (2010). Fair is worth fighting for: Green Party Manifesto, General 
Election. Green Party, UK. 
 
PIK & GRI-LSE (2009). Towards a global green recovery: recommendations for 
immediate G20 action. Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and 
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment. 
 
Porritt, J. (2009). Living within our means: avoiding the ultimate recession. 
London: Forum for the future. 
 
Poverty-Environment Partnership (2012). Building an inclusive green economy 
for all. Poverty-Environment Partnership. 
 
Raingold, A. (2011). Greening the economy: a strategy for growth, jobs and 
success. Aldersgate Group. 
 
Schepelmann, P., Goossens, Y., & Makipaa, A. (2009). Towards sustainable 
development: Alternatives to GDP for measuring progress (No. 42). Wuppertal 
Spezial, Wuppertal Institut für Klima, Umwelt und Energie. 
 
Schwarzer, J. (2013). Industrial policy for a green economy. International 
Institute for Sustainable Development. 
 
Sekulova, F., Kallis, G., Rodríguez-Labajos, B., & Schneider, F. (2013). 
Degrowth: from theory to practice. Journal of cleaner Production, 38, pp. 1-6. 
 
Share the World’s Resources (2011). International sharing: envisioning a new 
economy. Share the World’s Resources. 
 
Share the World’s Resources (2012). Financing the global sharing economy. 
Share the World’s Resources. 
 
 79  :: Pathways to a Green Economy: Deliverable 2.1 
Stiglitz, J. E., Sen, A., & Fitoussi, J. P. (2010). Report by the commission on the 
measurement of economic performance and social progress. Paris: 
Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social 
Progress. 
 
ten Brink, P., Badura, T., Bassi, S., Gantioler, S. and Kettunen, M. (2011). 
Estimating the overall economic value of the benefits provided by the Natural 
2000 Network. Institute for European Environmental Policy. 
 
Turner, G., Schandl, H., & Doss, T. (2008). Growing the green collar economy: 
Skills and labour challenges in reducing our greenhouse emissions and 
national environmental footprint. Dusseldrop Skills Forum. 
 
Urhammer, E., & Røpke, I. (2013). Macroeconomic narratives in a world of 
crises: An analysis of stories about solving the system crisis. Ecological 
Economics, 96, pp.62-70. 
 
UK PEAC (2012). A Green Economy. UK Parliament Environmental Audit 
Committee. 
 
UN (2012). The Future We Want: Outcome document adopted at the United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio +20). United Nations. 
 
UN, EC, IMF, OECD & World Bank (2003). Integrated environmental and 
economic accounting 2003: Handbook of national accounting. United Nations, 
European Commission, International Monetary Fund, Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, World Bank. 
 
UNEP (2010). Enabling conditions: supporting the transition to a global green 
economy. United Nations Environment Programme. 
 
UNEP (2011). Towards a green economy. United Nations Environment 
Programme. 
 
UNEP (2012). The Business Case for the Green Economy: Sustainable Return on 
Investment. United Nations Environment Programme. 
 
UNEP-WCMC (2011). The UK national ecosystem assessment technical report. 
UNEP-WCMC. 
 
UNU-IHDP (2012). Green economy and sustainability: A societal transformation 
process. Summary for decision-makers. UNU-IHDP. 
  
Van den Bergh, J. C. (2009). The GDP paradox. Journal of Economic 
Psychology, 30(2), pp.117-135. 
 
Victor, P. A., & Rosenbluth, G. (2007). Managing without growth. Ecological 
Economics, 61(2), pp.492-504. 
 
Vogelsang, S., Arndt-Brauer, I. & Bernschneider, F. (2012).  Arbeitsbericht 
Projektgruppe 2: Entwicklung eines ganzheitlichen Wohlstands- bzw. 
Fortschrittsindikators. Enquete-Kommission Wachstum, Wohlstand, 
Lebensqualität des Deutschen Bundestages. Berlin: Kommissionsdrucksache. 
 
WAVES (2012). Moving beyond GDP: How to factor natural capital into 
economic decision making. Wealth Accounting and Valuing Ecosystem Services. 
 
Worldbank (2011). The changing wealth of nations: Measuring sustainable 
development in the new millennium. The International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development / The World Bank. 
 
WWF UK (2012). Building green economies: Creating prosperity for people and 
planet. World Wildlife Fund UK. 
 
Yap, N. T. (2005). Towards a Circular Economy. Greener Management 
International, 2005(50), pp.10-24.  
 81  :: Pathways to a Green Economy: Deliverable 2.1 
Annex 4 :: Experts interviewed 
Alexander Girvan: Cropper Foundation 
Andreas Versmann: European Economic and Social Committee 
Andrew Simms: Global Witness, NEF 
António Alvarenga: Portuguese Environment Agency 
Bedrich Moldan: Charles University 
Blake Alcott: Independent academic 
Bram Edens: Statistics Netherlands (CBS) 
Carlos Carvalho - Portuguese Institute of Statistics (INE) 
Claúdia Sousa: Banco Espirito Santo 
Cliff Cobb: Redefining Progress 
Cristina Ramos: Portuguese Institute of Statistics (INE) 
Dan O’Neill: University of Leeds 
David Reiner: Judge Business School, University of Cambridge 
Dorothee Braun: Council for Sustainable Development, Germany 
Eric Gerritsen: Ministry of Economic Affairs, Netherlands 
Farooq Ullah: Stakeholder Forum 
Frank Hönerbach: Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, 
Building and Nuclear Safety, Germany 
Garret Tankosic-Kelly: SEE Change Network 
Gaylor Montmasson-Clair: Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS) 
Gitanjali Kumar: Development Alternatives 
Gus Speth: Vermont Law School 
Helmut Haberl: The Institute of Social Ecology, Klagenfurt University 
Jacques Bonnin: European Commission  
Jayati Ghosh: Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, School of Social 
Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University 
Jörg Mayer-Ries: Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, 
Building and Nuclear Safety, Germany 
Jyrki Laitinen: Syke, Finnish Environment Institute 
Klaus Jakob: Freie Universität Berlin 
Lew Daly: Demos 
Lili Fuhr: Heinrich Böll Stiftung 
Luis Gamez: Public Utilities Company of Heredia (ESPH) 
Luísa Serra: Energias de Portugal 
Molly Scott Cato: University of Roehampton 
Nuno Oliveira: Instituto Superior Técnico 
 Oliver Dudok van Heel: Aldersgate Group 
Paola Migliorini: European Commission 
Paul Allen: Centre for Alternative Technology  
Paul Ekins: University College London 
Pedro Paes: Energias de Portugal 
Peter Czaga: European Commission 
Peter May: Federal University of Rio de Janeiro 
Peter Victor: York University  
Philipp Schepelmann: Wuppertal Institute 
Raimundo Soares: Instituto ORIOR 
Rajesh Makwana: Share the World’s Resources 
Remko ter Weijden: Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, 
Netherlands 
Riccarda Retsch: Council for Sustainable Development, Germany 
Rob Dietz: Centre for Advancement of the Steady State Economy 
Ross Gurdin: Confederation of British Industry 
Ruth Potts: Bread, Print & Roses/The Green New Deal 
Sjoerd Schenau: Statistics Netherlands (CBS) 
Stefan Giljum: Vienna University of Economics and Business 
Susana Fonseca : Quercus (National Association of Nature Conservation) 
Tiago Domingos : Instituto Superior Técnico 
Tim Kasser: Knox College 
Tomás Ramos: Universidade Nova de Lisboa 
  
 83  :: Pathways to a Green Economy: Deliverable 2.1 
Annex 5 :: Seminar participants 
Angel Hsu: Environmental Performance Measurement Program, Yale University 
António Alvarenga: Agencia Portuguesa do Ambiente  
Arno Behrens: Centre for European Policy Studies 
Beata Maciewska: Green Institute Foundation/Zielony Instytut 
Beth Stratford: University of Roehampton 
Charles Seaford: NEF 
Claire Hardgrave: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
Dan O’Neill: University of Leeds 
Danielle Paffard: Centre for Alternative Technology 
Emily Benson: Green Economy Coalition 
Floor Brouwer: LEI Wageningen UR 
Inês Cosme: CENSE: The Centre for Environmental and Sustainability Research 
James Evans: Office for National Statistics 
Jan Bakkes: PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 
Karen Jeffrey: NEF 
Katharina Stepping: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik 
Laura Aylett: Department for Energy and Climate Change 
Lucas Porsch: Ecologic Institute 
Lucien Georgeson: University College London 
Marco Morosini: ETH Zürich 
Markku Lehtonen: University of Sussex 
Martin O’Connor: Université de Versailles 
Maya Göpel: Wuppertal Institut  
Oliver Greenfield: Green Economy Coalition 
Oliver Dudock van Heel: Aldersgate Group 
Paul Allin: Imperial College 
Paul Schreyer: OECD 
Pedro Beca: CENSE, The Centre for Environmental and Sustainability Research 
René Verburg: LEI Wageningen UR 
Saamah Abdallah: NEF 
Sara Davies: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Stephen Devlin: NEF 
Terri Kafyeke: Ecologic Institute 
Tomasz Kozluk: OECD 
Vasileios Rizos: Centre for European Policy Studies 
Will McDowall: Green Economy Policy Commission  
 End notes 
                                           
1 European Environment Agency (2011) Europe’s environment – An assessment of 
assessments. Copenhagen: European Environment Agency.
 
2
 UNEP. (n.d.) What is GEI? Retrieved from 
http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/aboutgei/whatisgei/tabid/29784/default.aspx [accessed 
18/03/2014]. 
3 
Rockström, J., Steffen, W., Noone, K., Persson, Å., Chapin, F. S., Lambin, E. F., & Foley, 
J. A. (2009). A safe operating space for humanity. Nature, 461(7263), pp.472-475.
 
4 
Daly, H. E. (1991). Steady-state economics: with new essays. California: Island Press.
 
5 
Jackson, T. (2009). Prosperity without growth: Economics for a finite planet. London: 
Routledge.
 
6 
Creech, H. (2011). SEED Symposium: The Green Economy – Accelerating the transition. 
International Institute for Sustainable Development.
 
7
 Turner, G., Schandl, H., & Doss, T. (2008). Growing the green collar economy: Skills 
and labour challenges in reducing our greenhouse emissions and national 
environmental footprint. Dusseldrop Skills Forum. 
8
 Fay, M. (2012). Inclusive Green Growth: The Pathway to Sustainable Development. 
World Bank
.
 
9
 Jackson, T. (2009). Prosperity without growth: Economics for a finite planet. London: 
Routledge. 
10
 Easterlin, R. A., McVey, L. A., Switek, M., Sawangfa, O., & Zweig, J. S. (2010). The 
happiness–income paradox revisited. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
107(52), 22463-22468. 
11
 Abdallah, S., Thompson, S., Michaelson, J., Marks, N. & Steuer, N. (2009) The 
(un)Happy Planet Index 2.0. London: The new economics foundation. 
12
 Sachs, J. D., Layard, R., & Helliwell, J. F. (2012). World happiness report. The Earth 
Insitute-Columbia University. 
13
 International Trade Union Confederation (2012). Growing green and decent jobs. 
International Trade Union Confederation. 
14
 ILO (2012). Working Towards Sustainable Development. International Labour 
Organization. 
15
 FAO (2010). Payments for environmental services within the context of the green 
economy. Food and Agriculture  Organization of the United Nations. 
16
 Creech, H. (2011). SEED Symposium: The Green Economy – Accelerating the 
transition. International Institute for Sustainable Development. 
17
 Fay, M. (2012). Inclusive Green Growth: The Pathway to Sustainable Development. 
World Bank
.
 
18
 Kamp-Roelands, N., Balkenende, J. P. & van Ommen, P. (2012). Towards sustainable 
growth business models. Dutch Sustainable Growth Coalition. 
 
